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Franchise stores employ nearly nine million people in the United States.
Many franchisors, which own trademarks that they license to franchisees, are
among the largest, most sophisticated corporations in the United States. Yet
franchise store employees are often paid below the minimum wage and fre-
quently report unsafe workplaces and workplace discrimination.
The thesis of this Article is that widespread employment law noncompli-
ance in franchise stores is symptomatic of the failure of employment law to
recognize the measures that franchisors use to protect their brand in franchise
stores. Franchisors often develop intensive relationships with franchisees and
franchise store employees as representatives of the brand, and provide fran-
chisees with required or recommended personnel standards and business
tools. These standards and tools can encourage mployment law violations by
triggering employment law obligations, which franchisees, who own and oper-
ate franchise stores, have little incentive to understand or follow. Yet the joint
employer doctrine, which holds contractors that are joint employers jointly
and severally liable for employment law violations by subcontractors, often
does not recognize these measures as evidence of joint employment. Courts,
accordingly, often reject joint employer claims against franchisors, even when
the franchise relationship may mask or encourage mployment law violations
in franchise stores.
Although most scholarship focuses on the joint employer doctrine to de-
ter subcontractor employment law violations, this Article argues that improv-
ing compliance in franchise stores will require liability standards that
recognize these unique features of franchising and do not depend on a joint
employer determination. It identifies apparent agency and misrepresentation
theories in existing law that would hold franchisors liable for employment law
violations based on their representations to franchisees and franchise store
employees. It offers these standards as a conceptual framework to deter em-
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ployment law violations in franchise stores and evaluates potential over- and
underdeterrence critiques. This analysis has important implications for the
governance of contractual relationships in which a firm contracts out for em-
ployees who represent he firm's brand to the consumer.
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INTRODUCTION
Franchising' employs nearly nine million people in the United
States.2 It is a dominant business model in the service economy, par-
ticularly the fast food sector, and accounts for half of retail sales in the
United States.3 Franchising is a paradigmatic example of the "fissured
workplace,"4 in which firms contract out labor-intensive services in or-
der to reduce management costs, the need for upfront capital, the risk
of liability, and business failure. It is unique among contracting ar-
rangements in permitting franchisors to maintain a strong brand iden-
tity through uniform products and services across thousands of units
in geographically dispersed markets, while allowing franchisees, who
are often first-time business owners, to own and operate a business
without previous training or a business plan.
1 Franchising is a contractual relationship in which a firm-the franchisor-delegates
store ownership and operation to a subcontractor-the franchisee-who purchases a limited li-
cense to use the franchisor's trademark in a geographically defined area, usually in return for an
upfront fee and royalties. See JEFFREY L. BRADACH, FRANCHISE ORGANIZATIONS 3 (1998); Gil-
lian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42
STAN. L. REV. 927, 934 (1990); Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the
Franchise Contract, in FRANCHISE CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATION 19 (Francine Lafontaine
ed., 2005) [hereinafter FRANCHISE CONTRACTING].
2 INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2016 Top MARKETS REPORT
FRANCHISING 7 (2016).
3 Id. The fast food sector had over 190,000 franchise stores in 2017, the largest number of
any sector in the United States, followed by 110,236 personal services franchise establishments
and 106,207 business services franchise establishments. IHS MARKIT ECON., FRANCHISE BUSI-
NESS ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR 2018, at 17 (2018).
4 David Weil describes franchising as a type of "fissuring," in which firms contract out to
preserve "the benefits of a strong brand while controlling labor costs (particularly important for
service businesses, where labor represents a significant share of costs)." DAVID WEIL, THE Fis-
SURED WORKPLACE 122 (2014).
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Franchise store employees are often low wage.- The fast food sec-
tor, where a plurality of franchise store employees work,6 pays among
the lowest wages in the U.S. economy.7 United States Department of
Labor ("DOL") investigations have found widespread violations of
wage-and-hour law in franchise stores,8 and franchise store employee
surveys and litigation also suggest a high incidence of workplace inju-
ries and employment discrimination as well.9
Employment law violations appear to be far more frequent in
franchise stores than franchisor-owned stores. David Weil, comparing
DOL investigations of fast food franchisee- and franchisor-owned
stores, found that franchisee-owned stores are twenty-four percent
more likely to violate wage-and-hour law than comparable franchisor-
owned stores, and that where DOL found violations, franchise store
employees were owed about fifty percent more back wages than em-
ployees in franchisor-owned stores.10 Franchisees of large, sophisti-
5 See Franchise Employment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Feb. 22, 2016), https://
www.census.gov/library/visualizations/2016/comm/cbl6-tpsl
7_franchise.html [https://perma.cc/
BN6D-AMX3] (finding that the majority of franchisee employees work in service sector, includ-
ing fast food, hotels, and home health care); see also Drew Desilver, Where Near-Minimum-
Wage Workers Work, and How Much They Make, PEw RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/11/17/where-near-minimum-wage-workers-work-
and-how-much-they-make/ [https://perma.cc/BN8Z-T95D].
6 The fast food sector employs 3.6 million franchise store employees, the highest number
of any sector, and with the million franchise store employees in full service restaurants, most
franchise store employees in the United States work in food service. IHS MARKIT ECON., supra
note 3, at 17.
7 Fast food employees earn an average hourly minimum wage of $9.73 per hour, which
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded as the lowest average wage of all U.S. occupations
except for gaming dealers. May 2017 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates:
United States, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/
oes-nat.htm#00-0000 [https://perma.cc/XVY5-6HWK].
8 An analysis of DOL investigations from 2000 to 2013, for example, showed that DOL
found 17,000 FLSA violations in Subway's 26,000 chain stores, the worst record in the industry.
See Annalyn Kurtz, Subway Leads Fast Food Industry in Underpaying Workers, CNN MONEY
(May 1, 2014, 3:50 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/01/news/economy/subway-labor-viola
tions [https://perma.cc/5WXU-S93F].
9 See, e.g., HART RESEARCH Assocs., KEY FINDINGS FROM A SURVEY ON FAST FOOD
WORKER SAFETY (2015), https://hartresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Fast-Food-
Worker-Survey-Memo-10-5-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/THL5-A39X] (reporting that eighty-seven
percent of 1,500 surveyed fast food workers report that they suffered a workplace injury in the
previous year, and seventy-eight percent reported multiple injuries during the same period);
Daniel Wiessner, McDonald's, Franchisees Hit with Sexual Harassment Complaints, REUTERS
(Oct. 5, 2016, 12:24 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/mcdonalds-complaint/mcdonalds-fran
chisees-hit-with-sexual-harassment-complaints-idUSL2N1CA1QB [https://perma.cc/QL8G-
JK2A] (highlighting complaints filed by fifteen employees alleging sexual harassment by manag-
ers in McDonald's franchise stores).
10 WEIL, supra note 4, at 131; see also MinWoong Ji & David Weil, Does Ownership Struc-
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cated franchisors often violate wage-and-hour laws even as these
franchisors overwhelmingly comply with them." These investigations
showed, for example, "that one-half of the top twenty brands had no
violations and owed no back wages at any of their company-owned
outlets even though the franchisees in those same companies often
owed substantial back wages to employees."1 2
Why, given that national franchisors are among the most profita-
ble and sophisticated firms in the United States, have a reputational
interest in legal compliance, and operate stores themselves in compli-
ance with employment law standards, do violations in franchise stores
seem to be widespread?
This Article argues that at the root of low workplace standards in
franchise stores is the franchisor's deep involvement in franchise store
operations, which can mask and even encourage violations. Unlike
many other types of contracting out arrangements, franchise store em-
ployees are the representatives of the franchisor's brand to the con-
sumer. To protect their brand, franchisors exercise indirect control
over franchise stores through internal branding measures that implic-
itly promise that franchise store employees that champion the brand
to the consumer will work in a stable, well-run workplace that .com-
plies with employment laws. However, franchisors do not monitor em-
ployment law compliance in franchise stores; on the contrary,
franchisors often provide personnel practices and business tools to
franchisees without informing franchisees that these policies trigger
employment law obligations that franchisees are unaware of and have
little incentive to follow. Employment law violations predictably
ensue.
The joint employer doctrine, the primary employment law liabil-
ity regime for subcontracting arrangements that holds all firms jointly
and severally liable if they "codetermine"13 terms and conditions of
employment, often does not recognize these aspects of the franchise
relationship. Courts in joint employer claims against franchisors adopt
a narrow right to control test that excludes evidence of the indirect
ture Influence Regulatory Behavior? The Impact of Franchising on Labor Standards Compliance
3 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2010-21, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1623387 [https://perma.cclW733-DL3S]; Alan B. Kreuger, Ownership,
Agency, and Wages: An Examination of Franchising in the Fast Food Industry, in FRANCHISE
CONTRACTING, supra note 1, at 517, 540 (finding that employees in franchise stores are paid
lower wages than in franchisor-owned stores).
11 See WEIL, supra note 4, at 132.
12 Id.
13 Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, 848 F.3d 125, 141 (4th Cir. 2017).
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and remote measures that franchisors use to control franchise stores.
Even a broader version of the joint employer standard that considers
these factors would not credit the franchise store employee's reasona-
ble belief that franchisors are responsible for ensuring legal compli-
ance in franchise stores and would not impose a specific duty on
franchisors for personnel policies that trigger employment law obliga-
tions. The recent history, moreover, of potential widening of the joint
employer standard, followed by legislative and administrative back-
lash, casts doubt on the joint employer doctrine as a broad, durable
standard to regulate franchisor representations that may mask or en-
courage employment law violations.
This Article offers theories of franchisor liability, outside of the
traditional joint employer doctrine but found in existing law, to im-
prove employment law compliance in franchise stores. Emergent liti-
gation shows how apparent agency and misrepresentation theories can
ground this analysis by hinging on franchisor measures that mask or
encourage employment law noncompliance in franchise stores. Ap-
parent agency, under both common law and some state labor laws,
would hold jointly liable those franchisors that use internal branding
measures that create a reasonable belief among franchise store em-
ployees that the franchisor is responsible for ensuring legal compli-
ance in franchise stores. State fraud and franchise laws, which regulate
franchisor misrepresentations to franchisees, would hold franchisors
liable for encouraging franchisee use of policies and business tools
that trigger employment law obligations without taking reasonable ef-
forts to ensure compliance with those legal requirements. Confining
franchisor liability to representations to franchise store employees and
franchisees can also address objections that a broad joint employer
doctrine will create unpredictable franchisor obligations or harm
franchising as a business model. Although already available under ex-
isting law, lawmaking can elaborate these doctrines to make them
more effective in encouraging employment law compliance in
franchise stores, particularly in jurisdictions in which these theories
are limited by heightened reliance requirements.
The effect of franchisor measures to protect the brand on em-
ployment law compliance in franchise stores is an underdiscussed
topic. 14 Other scholars, notably David Weil, have previously argued
14 Economists and law scholars typically examine the problem of opportunism in franchis-
ing as a double-sided moral hazard, between the franchisors, which impose comprehensive stan-
dards on franchisees to protect their brand, and franchisees, which ignore standards that
franchisors do not monitor in order to increase store profit. As Gillian Hadfield argues, this
912 [Vol. 86:907
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that contracting out creates financial pressure for franchisees to lower
costs in ways that can violate wage-and-hour law,15 but this Article
shows that franchisors can also directly encourage a broad range of
employment law violations by recommending business policies and
tools that trigger employment law obligations in franchise stores with-
out monitoring compliance. Although previous scholarship critiquing
the joint employer doctrine has recommended theoretical third-party
liability standards to induce contractors to improve subcontractor em-
ployment law compliance,16 this Article is the first to offer liability
standards outside of the joint employer doctrine but found in existing
law. This Article also builds on previous scholarship about the psycho-
logical contract-formed by mutual, implicit promises in the employ-
ment relationship7-by identifying internal branding practices that
can create an implicit promise between franchisors and franchise store
employees. These practices can create a reasonable expectation that,
in return for effectively championing the franchisor's brand to the
consumer, franchise store employees will work in a well-run store that
complies with employment laws.
Although franchising encompasses a variety of business models,
this Article will focus on business format franchising, in which
franchisors condition the franchise agreement on franchisee compli-
ance with the franchisor's business system and process.18 This is the
dominant form of franchising in the United States, particularly in the
service sector where most franchising occurs.19 The liability standards
offered in this Article have less relevance in a distributorship model of
creates incentives for opportunistic behavior by the franchisor even if they run counter to the
reasonable expectations of franchisees. This includes the imposition of standards that improve
the franchisor's brand but cut deep into franchisees' profits. Hadfield, supra note 1, at 951-53.
This Article agrees with Professor Hadfield's analysis that franchisors can structure the franchise
relationship to control franchise store operations by conditioning franchise agreements on fran-
chisee dependency on the franchisor. It also argues that, independent from this contractual rela-
tionship, franchisors can also protect their brands by bypassing franchisees and developing
relationships directly with franchise store employees through internal branding practices.
15 See WEIL, supra note 4, at 121-23.
16 See Alan Hyde, Nonemployer Responsibility for Labor Conditions, in WHO IS AN EM-
PLOYEE AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER? 409, 416-17 (Kati L. Griffith & Samuel Estreicher eds.,
2015); Steven A. Carvell & David Sherwyn, It Is Time for Something New: A 21st Century Joint-
Employer Doctrine for 21st Century Franchising, 5 AM. U. Bus. L. REV. 5, 11-12, 35-36 (2015);
Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
1, 1-2 (2010).
17 Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 550 (2001).
18 BRADACH, supra note 1, at 3-5, 23, 85.
19 Id.
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franchising, in which the franchisor has a limited role in franchise
store operations.20 In contrast, this analysis has important implications
for other business models that rely on third-party intermediaries to
manage the employees who champion the brand to consumers.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I charts the measures that
franchisors use to protect their brand-delineated as dependency,
control, and loyalty measures-and concludes that these measures
(1) can cause franchise store employees to reasonably believe that
they are employed by the franchisor and (2) can encourage employ-
ment law violations in franchise stores. Part II explains that the joint
employer doctrine, which holds jointly and severally liable those enti-
ties with the right to control the workplace, can elide the dependency,
control, and loyalty measures that franchisors take to protect the
brand-requiring theories outside of the joint employer doctrine to
improve employment law compliance. Part III offers an extension of
franchisor liability, grounded in apparent agency and misrepresenta-
tion theories, to regulate franchisor representations to franchisees and
franchise store employees, and suggests lawmaking to improve these
standards in state employment, fraud, and franchise laws. It will also
address the critique that increased franchisor regulation will cause
overdeterrence and examine recent legislation in Australia that offers
an alternative proposal of a negligence standard to improve the
franchisor's standard of care. The Article concludes that a liability
standard grounded in apparent agency and misrepresentation theories
will improve employment law compliance in franchise stores, with less
of a risk of over- or underdeterrence than alternative liability regimes.
I. FRANCHISOR MEASURES TO PROTECT THE BRAND AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT LAW COMPLIANCE IN
FRANCHISE STORES
The growth of franchising since the 1980s2 1 is emblematic of the
larger transformation of the production process, from firm-based to
20 Some businesses, such as soft-drink bottlers, automobile dealerships, and gasoline ser-
vice stations, often use a distributorship model that does not require a business system or pro-
cess, and simply provides franchisees with a limited license to use the franchisor's trademark,
equipment, and materials in a regional market in return for franchisee fees. See Francine Lafon-
taine & Roger D. Blair, The Evolution of Franchising and Franchise Contracts: Evidence from
the United States, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 381, 383-85 (2009) (describing traditional
model of franchising); see also HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 158-59
(1996) (describing franchisor-retailer cooperatives, in which the retailer members are the exclu-
sive shareholders).
21 See Lafontaine & Blair, supra note 20, at 395 (concluding that "franchising has grown
[Vol. 86:907
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network-based, throughout the U.S. economy.22 But while other forms
of contracting seek to outsource services that are outside the firm's
core competency, franchising permits firms to control their own pro-
duction process by indirectly and remotely controlling franchise store
operations while outsourcing the risk and liabilities of store owner-
ship.23 As business scholar Jeffrey Bradach shows, to do this,
franchisors adopt a hybrid, or plural, model of franchisor and fran-
chisee ownership of stores.24 Retaining some stores for direct owner-
ship allows franchisors to perfect their business systems and processes
in the units they directly control before requiring franchisees to adopt
those business systems and processes.25 Franchising also provides flex-
ibility in how, and to whom, to delegate store ownership. Franchisors
may select new, single-unit franchisees, who may need more support
to learn the franchisor's business process and system to supplement
firm-owned stores in densely populated areas, while preferring multi-
unit franchisees, which tend to be more sophisticated and indepen-
dent, to operate in isolated regions where competition would
otherwise prevent growth.26 The result is a flexible mix of firm-owned
and single- and multiunit franchisees to expand and contract owner-
ship of chain stores based on operational costs and liabilities, and the
firm's capital accumulation and brand value.27
These undeniable benefits of franchising to franchisors (and to
franchisees, who may operate a profitable franchise store without pre-
vious business experience28), however, are contingent on the ability of
somewhat faster than the overall economy," from "12.8% of GDP in the mid-1980s" to "14 to
14.5% of GDP" in the 2000s).
22 See June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. 963, 1016
(2017).
23 WEIL, supra note 4, at 122-26.
24 In this model, franchisors may elect to directly own and operate chain stores where
monitoring and operational costs are low and to delegate ownership to franchisees when the
franchisors lack capital or when agency costs are high. BRADACH, supra note 1, at 63-75;
Francine Lafontaine & Margaret E. Slade, Retail Contracting and Costly Monitoring: Theory and
Evidence, in FRANCHISE CONTRACTING, supra note 1, at 367, 375 (noting that firms are more
likely to franchise in sectors where store-level monitoring costs are high).
25 See BRADACH, supra note 1, at 149-50.
26 See id. at 68-75 (discussing the relative costs and benefits of unit growth through new
franchisees and existing, multiunit franchisees). See generally Alanson P. Minkler, Why Firms
Franchise: A Search Cost Theory, 148 J. INsTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 240, 240-59
(1992) (finding that franchisees primarily absorb the risk of franchisor expansion).
27 This mix may change over time, with greater levels of franchising at the outset as a
growth strategy, to a plural model of firm-owned and multiunit franchisees as the franchisor
matures, achieves greater brand recognition, and faces fewer capital constraints.
28 Economists Patrick Kaufmann and Francine Lafontaine estimate that McDonald's fran-
chisees in the 1980s earned an annual profit of between five and six percent on a franchise store.
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franchisors to control those aspects of store operations important to
maintain their brand image. As in any network relationship, the risk
for franchisors is a loss of control over operations to franchisees, who
are responsible for day-to-day operations.29 This is a particular risk in
the service sector, in which franchisors must ensure that franchise
store employees effectively represent the brand to the consumer.30
New and single-unit franchisees are often unsophisticated and require
supervision to operate effectively,31 and all franchisees have a free-
rider interest in maximizing profit by attracting customers with the
franchisor's brand name while cutting costs by shirking on franchisor
standards that reduce profit.32 Franchisee failure may cause a loss of
market share in a region, while franchisee shirking may associate the
franchisor with an inferior product or service.33 Franchisors, moreo-
ver, may be equally concerned with shirking by franchise store manag-
ers and employees as by franchisees because the franchisor's growth
hinges on whether franchise store employees faithfully represent the
brand to the consumer.3 4 Nor does delegation of ownership to fran-
Patrick J. Kaufmann & Francine Lafontaine, Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for
McDonald's Franchisees, in FRANCHISE CONTRACTING, supra note 1, at 276, 285 & tbl.2, cited in
WEIL, supra note 4, at 127-29.
29 Economists often study franchising through the lens of principal-agent theory, and refer
to this risk as one side of a doubled-sided moral hazard. See Sugato Bhattacharyya & Francine
Lafontaine, Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Share Contracts, in FRANCHISE CON-
TRACTING, supra note 1, at 114, 114-34; Francine Lafontaine & Emmanuel Raynaud, Residual
Claims and Self-Enforcement as Incentive Mechanisms in Franchise Contracts: Substitutes or
Complements?, in FRANCHISE CONTRACTING, supra note 1, at 435, 435-36.
30 Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying into the Brand at Work, 95 IowA L. REV.
1179, 1183-84 (2010); Majken Schultz, Yun Mi Antorini & Fabian F. Csaba, Corporate Brand-
ing-An Evolving Concept, in CORPORATE BRANDING 9, 10-11, 18 (Majken Schultz et al. eds.,
2005); see, e.g., Deven R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, 64 FLA. L. REV. 981, 983, 985-86
(2012); Ceridwyn King, Debra Grace & Scott Weaven, Developing Brand Champions: A Fran-
chisee Perspective, 29 J. MARKETING MGMT. 1308, 1309-10 (2013).
31 See, e.g., Timothy Bates, Survival Patterns Among Newcomers to Franchising, 13 J. Bus.
VENTURING 113, 113-14 (1998) (finding that new franchisees face a high rate of failure com-
pared with multiunit franchisees and cohort independent businesses).
32 Economics literature discusses this phenomenon as a free-riding incentive for franchis-
ees to use a national franchisor's reputation to entice customers while shirking on standards to
increase profit. See generally Bhattacharyya & Lafontaine, supra note 29, at 114-34; Steven C.
Michael, The Effect of Organizational Form on Quality: The Case of Franchising, in FRANCHISE
CONTRACTING, supra note 1, at 582, 582-83 (arguing that free riding prevents franchise store
from providing the same quality as other corporate forms).
33 BRADACH, supra note 1, at 5, 10-11; WEIL, supra note 4, at 12; see also Hadfield, supra
note 1, at 948-55; MinWoong Ji & David Weil, The Impact of Franchising on Labor Standards
Compliance, 68 INDUs. & LAB. REL. REV. 977, 979-80 (2015).
34 See Ceridwyn King & Debra Grace, Examining the Antecedents of Positive Employee
Brand-Related Attitudes and Behaviours, 46 EUR. J. MARKETING 469, 470 (2012) (U.K.) (finding
that "employees are considered particularly significant in the brand management of services ...
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chisees necessarily deter franchise store employee shirking. A fran-
chisee may not have an incentive to control franchise store employee
shirking that harms the franchisor's brand but does not cut into fran-
chisee profits.35 Moreover, unlike in a vertically integrated firm, the
franchisor often has limited ability to terminate a franchisee under the
franchise agreement,36 and has no direct contractual relationship with
franchise store managers and employees. Direct supervision of
franchise stores (and the termination of franchise agreements) is
costly for franchisors37 and has only indirect impacts on franchise store
managers and employees.
Properly understood, then, the central preoccupation for
franchisors in a franchise relationship is how to ensure that franchis-
ees and franchise store managers and employees faithfully represent
the brand to the consumer. Lacking a hierarchical relationship with
franchisees and franchise store employees as in a vertically integrated
firm, to maintain high, uniform operational standards, franchisors use
a mix of coercive and relational practices aimed at not only the fran-
chisee, but franchise store managers and employees.
The next Section will first chart the measures that franchisors use
to protect their brand, delineated as dependency, control, and loyalty.
Its purpose is to show that unique features of franchising can create a
set of mutual obligations between franchisors, franchisees, and
franchise store employees, both express and implied, which can mask
and encourage violations of employment law in franchise stores.
A. Dependency, Control, and Loyalty in the Franchise Relationship
To protect their brand, franchisors manage the franchise store re-
lationship with a mix of practices to ensure compliance with franchisor
standards: (1) dependency, through the franchisee selection process
and by extending franchisee dependence through required sunk costs,
because the functional and emotional values of the service brand are delivered through personal
interaction between consumers and employees").
35 This is particularly true of multiunit franchisees, which are less reliant on the
franchisor's operational guidance and delegate store operations to managers. In these instances,
the franchisor may rely on franchise store managers rather than franchisees to prevent shirking
by franchise store employees.
36 Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation: A Two-Standard Approach,
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 641, 666 n.153 (noting that eighteen states impose good cause require-
ments for franchisors seeking to terminate franchisees).
37 See James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form: The
Case of Franchising, in FRANCHISE CONTRACTING, supra note 1, at 53, 53-72 (finding that high
monitoring cost is an important factor in a firm's decision to franchise instead of operating a
company-owned store).
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broad grounds by which franchisors may terminate or refuse to re-
new-or to permit franchisees to purchase new units-in the franchise
agreement; (2) control, by supervising store operations through com-
prehensive operational standards that franchisees, their managers, and
employees must meet, and by monitoring those standards in franchise
stores; and (3) loyalty, by internal branding or relational systems to
instill brand loyalty in franchisees and franchise store managers
through business consulting services, operational tools, and policy gui-
dance to increase store profit, and in franchise store employees by
developing a uniform brand image to represent to store customers.38
These dependency, control, and loyalty measures are effective in
ensuring a uniform service in franchise stores, in part, because of in-
ternal branding measures that persuade franchisees and franchise
store employees to champion the brand to the customer. As Marion
Crain argues, firms use internal branding measures in addition to di-
rect control to "engender the sort of loyalty necessary to gain a com-
petitive advantage in the highly competitive service sector market."39
Internal branding measures that instill franchisee and franchise
store employee loyalty can create a psychological contract, entailing
mutual obligations not reflected in the franchise agreement.4 0 In
franchising, in lieu of an internal labor market in a vertically inte-
grated firm, franchisors can use internal branding measures to elicit an
implicit promise that franchise stores will champion the brand to the
consumer; in return, franchisees will own a profitable business with
high consumer demand and low turnover, and franchise store employ-
ees will work in a stable, well-run store that complies with workplace
laws. As we will see at the conclusion of this Part, this implicit promise
to franchise store employees is often not borne out in reality.
The following account of franchisor dependency, control, and loy-
alty measures draws from franchise scholarship and recent franchise
store employee litigation claiming that franchisors are joint employ-
38 See WEIL, supra note 4, at 123-25; Mark A.P. Davies et al., A Model of Trust and
Compliance in Franchise Relationships, 26 J. Bus. VENTURING 321, 321-25 (2011); Hadfield,
supra note 1, at 960-65 (1990).
39 Crain, supra note 30, at 1186.
40 "[O]rganizational scholars have recognized that employees tend to develop a set of ex-
pectations about their relationship with the employer that extends beyond any formal contract,
but that is nonetheless perceived to entail genuine obligations." David W. Hart & Jeffrey A.
Thompson, Untangling Employee Loyalty: A Psychological Contract Perspective, 17 Bus. ETHICS
Q. 297, 302 (2007) (describing the elements of a psychological contract between employer and
employee). Katherine Stone has shown the value of the psychological contract for employers
seeking to persuade employees who can no longer rely on job security to invest in the firm's
work for training and future employability. Stone, supra note 17, at 570-71.
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ers.41 To be sure, franchisors use a different mix of these practices, and
some franchisors may use fewer coercive or relational practices than
others. Nonetheless, they collectively represent the distinct yet inter-
related ways that franchisors protect their brands in franchise stores.
1. Dependency, Control, and Loyalty in the Franchisor-
Franchisee Relationship
Franchisors use dependency, control, and loyalty measures to cre-
ate incentives for franchisees to adopt the franchisor's required and
recommended practices, despite free-rider incentives to ignore them.
Through dependency and control, franchisors ensure that franchisees
experience negative consequences (termination and loss of sunk capi-
tal) for failing to offer a uniform brand to customers, while loyalty
measures offer long-term career opportunities in return for adopting a
vast set of costly operational practices that might otherwise cut against
the franchisee's short-term interests.
Franchisees embed asymmetric dependence into the franchise re-
lationship in the franchise selection and contract formation stages.
Most franchisees at the outset of a franchise relationship are small,
thinly capitalized, relatively inexperienced business owners.42 This ap-
pears to be by design. Franchisors seek out franchise applicants who
seem likely to follow franchisor standards without question.4 3
Franchisors additionally generally require an initiation period for as-
piring franchisees-from weeks to years-of working in a franchisor-
or franchisee-owned store.44
41 See Ochoa v. McDonald's Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1230 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Verified
Petition for New York para. 3, People v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No. 450627/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
May 23, 2016) [hereinafter V. Pet. for N.Y.].
42 See Affidavit of Yash Sharma para. 5, People v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No. 450627/2016
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 23, 2016) [hereinafter Domino's Sharma Aff.] (stating that Domino's Pizza
franchisee had no prior relevant business training and no business degree); Robert W. Emerson
& Uri Benoliel, Are Franchisees Well-Informed? Revisiting the Debate over Franchise Relation-
ship Laws, 76 ALB. L. REv. 193, 206-09 (2013) (finding that the typical franchisees lack business
experience); Kimberley A. Morrison, An Empirical Test of a Model of Franchisee Job Satisfac-
tion, 34 J. SMALL Bus. MGMT. 27, 30 (1996) (finding that eighty percent of franchisees are first-
time business owners); Elizabeth Garone, The New Face of Franchisees, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19,
2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324021104578553580349491440 [https://
perma.cc/DZA6-SSEZ] (noting that eighty-one percent of franchisees only own one unit).
43 See BRADACH, supra note 1, at 69-70; John L. Hanks, Franchisor Liability for the Torts
of Its Franchisees: The Case for Substituting Liability as a Guarantor for the Current Vicarious
Liability, 24 OKLA. CiTy U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1999) ("[Flranchisors typically do not favor individu-
als with strong entrepreneurial eanings. . . . They are expected to toe the line when it comes to
abiding by the prescribed operating procedures.").
44 See BRADACH, supra note 1, at 70-71; see, e.g., Affidavit of Robert Cookston paras.
8-11, People v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No. 450627/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 23, 2016) [hereinafter
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Asymmetric dependence is also woven into franchise relation-
ships through the initial franchise fee and other sunk costs. These
costs can range into the hundreds of thousands of dollars,45 which can
constitute the franchisee's entire life savings. Franchisors limit the
ability of franchisees to diversify their risk by investing in other busi-
nesses in the sector and to act as a passive investor, effectively requir-
ing franchisees to maximize their effort in order to recoup their
investment.46 Franchisors maintain asymmetric dependence by retain-
ing ultimate authority to permit a franchisee to sell or close an unprof-
itable franchise store and conditioning growth from single- to
multiunit franchisees on store profitability.47 Because franchisors also
operate their own stores, they have superior expertise in business
practices that maximize store profit. Franchisees, accordingly, depend
on franchisor expertise in store operations to recoup their initial
investment.48
Franchisors extend the franchisee's initial dependence on the
franchisor with contract specifications that condition store operation
on compliance with the franchisor's business system and process, with
the threat of franchise termination or nonrenewal and loss of sunk
costs that entails, if franchisees fail to meet franchisor standards.49
Franchisors integrate all operational standards into the franchise
agreement, creating a standing and wide-ranging series of obligations
that franchisors may enforce through increasingly coercive measures
up to franchise termination.50
Although franchisors often cannot exert the same level of direct
control over franchise store operations as in a vertically integrated
firm, franchisors do use some forms of direct control, conditioning the
Domino's Cookston Aff.] (explaining that franchisee began work with Domino's as a driver,
working his way up to be a manager in training, manager, and supervisor position before apply-
ing to become a franchisee).
45 Hadfield, supra note 1, at 934-35 & tbl.1.
46 See, e.g., Domino's Cookston Aff., supra note 44, para. 13; Domino's Sharma Aff., supra
note 42, para. 6 (alleging that franchisees are prohibited from owning outside businesses or being
absent from franchise stores for more than thirty days without Domino's permission).
47 See, e.g., Domino's Cookston Aff., supra note 44, para. 15 (alleging that before being
able to sell a store, franchisees are required to show Domino's that the store is staffed properly,
with a sufficiently high inspection score, and that before being allowed to close a store, Domino's
required him to show an inability to earn a profit despite meeting Domino's operational and
promotional requirements).
48 Rajiv P. Dant et al., An Introspective Examination of Single-Unit Versus Multi-Unit
Franchisees, 41 J. ACAD. MARKETING Sci. 473, 475 (2013).
49 WEIL, supra note 4, at 66-69 (excerpting detailed standards required in franchise
agreements).
50 Id. at 71-72.
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franchise agreement on exacting business specifications and a rigorous
inspection and monitoring system.51 Franchising, according to a KFC
division director, permits the franchisor to "run[] thousands of identi-
cal factories."52 Franchisors impose comprehensive operational stan-
dards on franchisees-breaking down each element of a production
process into hundreds of steps, from placing an order, to preparing a
food item, to packaging or delivering to the customer-and assign
specific metrics that each store must meet for each step.53 Franchisors
require new franchisees to obtain extensive training regarding these
standards, which can include personnel topics, such as "recruiting,
management selection, compensation and benefits, protecting your
business, and industry relations."54
Third, franchisors monitor these standards. Franchisors often de-
ploy a redundant, intensive monitoring system.5 5 Field auditors con-
duct random inspections to ensure that franchisees only use approved
products and equipment and evaluate performance on each of the
hundreds of standards; franchisors hire temporary "mystery shoppers"
to conduct the same inspections surreptitiously by role-playing a cus-
tomer; and franchisors require franchisees to install and use software
that tracks all of these steps and provides continuous reports about
the franchisees' operation.56
51 See BRADACH, supra note 1, at 23 (explaining that operating manuals "specify virtually
every aspect of a unit's operation," breaking down all activities "into minute parts and prescrib-
ing procedures for performing each part").
52 BRADACH, supra note 1, at 85. A Domino's Pizza franchisee, for example, alleges that
the franchisor's required computer tracking system requires his employees to log "each step of
the order preparation and dispatch process," in the system, "including placing the uncooked
pizza in the oven and the cooked pizza on the routing stand to await delivery," and that the
system records each of these times for the franchisor. Domino's Cookston Aff., supra note 44,
para. 16.
53 BRADACH, supra note 1, at 85-86.
54 Susan J. Wells, Franchisors Walk a Fine Line, Soc'v HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Aug. 1,
2004), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/pages/0804covstory.aspx#exposure
[https://perma.cc/JKJ7-39SL] (quoting Mari Fellrath, then-Senior Vice President of Franchise
Services and Human Resources at Great Clips) (franchising consultant stating that "[t]raining is
the vehicle for franchises to maintain their culture and brand" and describing one franchisor's
week-long franchisee training program).
55 See Second Amended Class & Collective Action Complaint para. 178, Ocampo v. 455
Hosp. LLC, 2016 WL 4926204 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2016) (No. 7:14-cv-9614), [hereinafter
Ocampo 2d Am. Class & Collective Action Compl.] ("By the regular QA inspections and audits,
the Franchisor Defendants enforced their control over Hotel employees by mandating the man-
ner and quality of their work.").
56 See BRADACH, supra note 1, at 83; WEIL, supra note 4, at 70-71; see, e.g., Ocampo 2d
Am. Class & Collective Action Compl., supra note 55, para. 175 ("Franchise Defendants regu-
larly perform both scheduled and unannounced audits and inspections of the Hotel, often multi-
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Advances in information technology have enabled forms of low-
cost, remote monitoring that have transformed the franchise relation-
ship.57 Franchisors increasingly require franchisees to install and use
information technology in stores that franchisors access and use as a
management information system ("MIS"). 58 Through MIS, franchisors
may provide daily and weekly reports to franchisees about store per-
formance, audit franchise store data against their established
benchmarks, and require franchisees to develop action plans if the op-
erational data do not meet the franchisor's standards.59 One franchisor
reports using data to track turnover rates at franchise stores, "which is
a great indicator . . . of HR practices."60
These dependency and control measures collectively permit the
franchisor to ensure that franchisees adopt its required and recom-
mended policies without exerting direct control. Franchisor selection
of unsophisticated and thinly capitalized franchisees can ensure fran-
chisee compliance with franchisor standards and recommendations in
order to recover sunk costs and avoid business failure.61 Franchisees
with little business experience are also more likely to associate busi-
ness success with following franchisor standards and recommenda-
tions because they lack previous business models as a comparison.
Termination of opportunistic or unprofitable franchisees can serve as
an example to compliant franchisees of the potential consequences of
noncompliance.
ple times in a year, to review 455 Hospitality's compliance. ); Domino's Cookston Aff.,
supra note 44, paras. 16, 47.
57 Although no recent study has compared franchisor monitoring of firm- and franchisee-
owned stores, some of these systems-including mystery shoppers and MIS-are relatively re-
cent additions to monitor franchise stores. In the 1990s, franchisors "rarely" used mystery shop-
pers for franchisors and did not use information systems to monitor franchise store operations.
See BRADACH, supra note 1, at 43, 83. Low-cost and real-time franchisor digital monitoring of
franchise stores, which requires franchisees to provide franchisors with access to franchise store
operational data, has eroded the prevailing assumption among franchisors and franchisees that
"a franchisee's operation [should be] opaque to" the franchisor because "[i]nformation played a
role in defining what it meant to be an independent businessperson." Id. at 43.
58 See Ocampo 2d Am. Class & Collective Action Compl., supra note 55, para. 173.
59 See, e.g., Cordova v. SCCF, Inc., No. 13CIV5665-LTS-HP, 2014 WL 3512838, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014) (explaining how corporate defendant maintained functional control by
providing programs to track performance of employees); Domino's Cookston Aff., supra note
44, paras. 16, 48.
60 Wells, supra note 54.
61 Emerson & Benoliel, supra note 42, at 209-12 (explaining that typical franchisees lack
business experience and fail to read or understand the terms of a franchise agreement); Morri-
son, supra note 42, at 30 (noting that that eighty percent of franchisees are first-time business
owners); Garone, supra note 42 (noting that eighty-one percent of franchisees only own one
unit).
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The coercive power of franchisors to enforce standards through
control and dependency, however, has its limits and can be counter-
productive. It runs up against the fact that franchisees operate legally
distinct entities which-unlike franchisor-owned chain store manag-
ers-cannot be terminated without cause.6 2 Even were this not the
case, franchise termination imposes costs on franchisors as well as
franchisees, including disruption to store operation and litigation
costs. Coercion can also undermine morale and engender disloyalty,
reducing customer satisfaction.63 Franchisors therefore have an incen-
tive to ensure the compliance of ranchisees through internal branding
measures to promote brand loyalty.64
To engender loyalty to the brand, franchisors use relational sys-
tems, or internal branding systems of support and inclusion of fran-
chisees in the brand identity.65 These internal branding measures are
distinct from external branding measures that franchisors use to build
customer affiliation with the brand. For franchisees, franchisors create
an information flow and provide tools and recommendations to im-
prove store profitability, including job descriptions for franchise store
employees and brand-specific interview and performance review
guides.66 Domino's Pizza, for example, provides franchisees with em-
ployment forms, applications, and interview guides, and Interconti-
nental Hotels Group, which owns franchisor Holiday Inns, provides
franchisees with template recruitment advertisements, employee n-
gagement surveys, recognition programs, and job postings on IHG's
career site.67
62 Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor's Duty of Care To-
ward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. REV. 905, 930 (1994).
63 See Davies et al., supra note 38, at 325; Lynne Zappone, How to Engage Franchise
Employees, Soc'Y FOR HuM. RESOURCE MGMT. (June 1, 2011), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/
news/hr-magazine/pages/0611zappone.aspx [https://perma.cc/FS85-62ZD] (arguing that
franchisor human resources tools for franchisees can decrease turnover and improve customer
satisfaction).
64 See King et al., supra note 30, at 1311 (arguing that "a communicative and trusting
relationship with franchisees . . . makes control much less of a problem and . . . avoids the need
to exert coercive power").
65 See id. at 1310. Brand literature refers to internal branding as "living the brand," or
strategies for firms to deepen employees' commitment to the values of the firm. See generally
Esben Karmark, Living the Brand, in CORPORATE BRANDING, supra note 30, at 103, 127.
66 See Zappone, supra note 63 (describing these tools, provided by Intercontinental Hotels
Group to its subsidiary franchisors' franchisees); Len Strazewski, Managing the Franchise, Hum.
RESOURCES EXECUTIVE ONLINE (Dec. 1, 2006), http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/view/
story.jhtml?id=8485517 [https://perma.cc/C7VJ-7NFR] (describing Domino's policies and busi-
ness tools).
67 See Zappone, supra note 63.
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For franchisees that follow franchisor standards and recommen-
dations, franchisors make an implied promise of long-term profit and
growth. Jeffrey Bradach describes the "cross-cutting career paths"
available to individuals in plural model of franchising as one of the
means by which franchisors can "exercise control over the franchise
arrangement."68 The single-unit franchisee complies with franchisor
standards with the expectation that this will enable the franchisee to
make a profit and to become a desirable candidate for new store of-
ferings. The multiunit franchisee complies with franchisee standards
to become an even larger multiunit enterprise across multiple regional
markets. Franchisees who internalize the myriad franchisor rules and
recommendations may reasonably expect that adhering to these stan-
dards will permit them to continue to operate and potentially grow
through the franchisor's network.69
2. Control and Loyalty in the Franchisor-Franchise Store
Employee Relationship
The franchisor depends on franchise store employees to effec-
tively champion the brand to the consumer. Franchisors have increas-
ingly recognized that high consumer satisfaction and low employee
turnover in franchise stores require measures that foster a direct rela-
tionship with franchise store employees. Unlike vertically integrated
firms, however, franchisors cannot control franchise store employee
behavior directly by contract because the franchise agreement is only
between franchisors and franchisees. Franchise agreements, moreo-
ver, disclaim any direct relationship between franchisors and franchise
store employees. Recognizing the centrality of the franchise store em-
ployee to the customer's experience and their limited ability to di-
rectly control franchise store employees, franchisors use control and
loyalty measures to foster a direct relationship with franchise store
employees both through and outside of the franchisee-franchise store
employee relationship.
First, many control measures that, in theory, franchisors impose
on franchisees are equally felt by franchise store employees.70 Many
68 BRADACH, supra note 1, at 55.
69 The psychological contract between franchisor and franchisee can also extend to the
franchise store manager, who may adhere to these standards in order to one day become a
franchisee or to transfer to the franchisor's employment as a franchise consultant.
70 In a recent, striking example of this, until widespread media attention led to the discon-
tinuance of the practice, franchisors often required franchisees to sign a "no-hire" agreement
prohibiting them from hiring other franchisees' employees, effectively forbidding franchise store
employees from profiting from their training through lateral transfers. See Rachel Abrams, Why
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franchisor standards control employee selection, appearance, de-
meanor, and job responsibilities, including precise service time re-
quirements, of franchise store employees?7 McDonald's "brand
'bible,' [for example,] specifies to employees how the brand values
'Quality', 'Service' and 'Cleanliness' [are] to be practiced in the day-
to-day work situation."72 Domino's Pizza markets its "brand image
and consistency of product quality, customer service and management
procedure" as "The Power of One," training franchise store employ-
ees in the same uniform standards as franchisor-owned store employ-
ees,73 and Domino's allegedly requires franchise store employees to
greet customers within nine seconds, to report to work clean shaven
with no visible tattoos or jewelry, and to address customer complaints
using the franchisor's uniform, structured method.74 The franchisor's
redundant management systems directly monitor franchise store em-
ployee activity, informing franchisees and franchise store managers if
franchise store employees do not meet the franchisor's required or
preferred performance metrics.75 Franchisors' own evaluations suggest
the effectiveness of these measures. Yum! Brands, which owns
franchisors including KFC, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell, attributes a drop
in customer complaints and reduction in turnover rates in its chain
stores to 113%-the average in the quick-service industry is 200%-
to setting and monitoring employment standards in franchise stores.76
Aren't Paychecks Growing? A Burger-Joint Clause Offers a Clue, N.Y. TimEs (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/business/pay-growth-fast-food-hiring.html [https://perma.cc/
HNC4-Q7ZV] (citing study showing that majority of franchisors, and nearly all fast food
franchisors, imposed some r striction limiting franchisee ability to hire employees from other
franchise stores).
71 See Plaintiffs' Corrected Reply in Support of Their Motion for Class Certification at 10,
Myers v. Jani-King of Philadelphia, Inc., 2015 WL 1055700 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2015) (No. 2:09-cv-
01738-RBS), affd sub nom. Williams v. Jani-King of Philadelphia Inc., 837 F.3d 314 (3d Cir.
2016) [hereinafter Jani-King Pls.' Corrected Reply Supp. Mot. Class Certification] ("Jani-King
maintains the right to direct the methods workers use to ... contact and communicate with Jani-
King's customers, set cleaning schedules, and present theinselves.").
72 Karmark, supra note 64, at 110. One state appellate court also referred to the Domino's
800-page manual "a veritable bible for overseeing a Domino's operation . .. [that] literally leaves
nothing to chance." Parker v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1026, 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993).
73 Strazewski, supra note 66.
74 Domino's Cookston Aff., supra note 44, para. 50 (describing the franchisor's "LEADS"
method-"Listen, ... Empathize," "Apologize,.. . Do Whatever it Takes, Stand by Your Prom-
ise"-for addressing customer complaints).
75 According to Professor Bradach, who observed these systems in operation in company-
owned stores, they can be "panoptical," instilling a fear of "being constantly watched and judged
without knowing when or by whom." BRADACH, supra note 1, at 89.
76 Wells, supra note 54.
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Second, franchisors also use loyalty measures, emphasizing the
franchise store employee's inclusion as a team member of the brand,
to enlist franchise store employees to positively represent the brand to
franchise store customers, often making little distinction between em-
ployees in firm-owned and franchisee-owned stores. Franchise store
employees often apply to work for the franchise store through the
franchisor's hiring portal;77 greet customers using the franchisor's
name;78 wear the same uniforms, undergo the same training, and per-
form the same jobs as firm-owned store employees;79 receive orienta-
tion materials, personnel forms, and paystubs that use only the
franchisor's name and trademark, and are referred to in those materi-
als as members of the franchisor's team.80
These control and loyalty measures can encourage franchise store
employees to identify with the franchisor, championing the
franchisor's brand to the consumer and lending the impression that
the employee ultimately works for the brand.8 1 In return for brand
loyalty, franchise store employees may expect "a steady job in a safe
environment," and that the franchisor "would make sure [they were]
paid and treated correctly, because it is a large corporation with stan-
dardized systems."82
77 See Second Declaration of Ernestina Sandoval para. 2, Ochoa v. McDonald's Corp., 133
F. Supp. 3d 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. 3:14-cv-02098-JD) [hereinafter McDonald's 2d Sandoval
Decl.] (McDonald's hiring portal); Wells, supra note 54 (Yum! Brands); Zappone, supra note 63
(Intercontinental Hotel Group).
78 See, e.g., McDonald's 2d Sandoval Decl., supra note 77 (alleging that franchise store
employees trained to greet customers with "Welcome to McDonald's").
79 See Jani-King PIs.' Corrected Reply Supp. Mot. Class Certification, supra note 71, at 4
("Jani-King maintains the right to direct the methods workers use to ... contact and communi-
cate with Jani-King's customers, set cleaning schedules, and present themselves."); Wells, supra
note 54.
80 See Ochoa, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 1240.
81 See, e.g., Declaration of Joseph Ayala para. 2, Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., 2017 WL
88999 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017) (No. 3:14-cv-02096-RS) ("I thought of myself as representing
McDonald's."); Declaration of Juvetta Brown para. 2, Salazar, 2017 WL 88999 (No. 3:14-cv-
02096-RS) ("I identified with the mission of McDonald's."); Declaration of Plaintiff Judith
Zarate in Opposition to McDonald's Motion for Summary Judgment para. 3, Salazar v. McDon-
aid's Corp., 2016 WL 4394165 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016) (No. 3:14-cv-02096-RS), [hereninafter
McDonald's Zarate Decl. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J.] ("I believed I was employed by McDonald's at
both stores. Both restaurants looked the same and were run and managed in the same way.
There was nothing in my job at either store that suggested that McDonald's was not my em-
ployer at both stores.").
82 Declaration of Plaintiff Guadalupe Salazar in Opposition to McDonald's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 3, Salazar, 2016 WL 4394165 (No. 3:14-cv-02096-RS); see also McDon-
ald's Zarate Decl. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J., supra note 81, para. 4 (alleging that franchise store
employee applied to franchisors on belief that they "would have more steady jobs and better
working conditions than smaller individual restaurants").
[Vol. 86:907
2018] FRANCHISE REGULATION FOR THE FISSURED ECONOMY 927
B. Franchisor Personnel Standards and Recommendations May
Encourage Employment Law Violations
Franchisor control, dependency, and loyalty measures can also
trigger employment law obligations in ways that ultimately harm
franchise store employees. As David Weil argues, franchisor opportu-
nism can create indirect incentives for franchisees to violate wage-
and-hour law. Because franchisors have an incentive to impose oner-
ous operational standards, and aggressively police nearly all cost vari-
ables except for employee wages, franchisees may rationally conclude
that suppressing employee wages is one of the few ways that franchise
stores can boost profit by cutting costs.8 3
Franchisor imposition of personnel requirements, recommenda-
tions, and business tools can also directly encourage employment law
violations, by triggering legal obligations that franchisees have little
incentive to understand or follow. 84 To begin, it is impossible to sepa-
rate employment practices from other business requirements required
of franchisees to operate within the franchisor's required operational
standards. Franchise store employees represent the brand to the con-
sumer and are ultimately responsible for meeting all franchisor guar-
antees to the customer. To meet these guarantees, franchisors suggest
and require franchise store employee hiring and appearance stan-
dards, pay policies, and job functions that trigger employment law ob-
ligations. Although a comprehensive list is beyond the scope of this
Article, the following examples demonstrate the impossibility of sepa-
rating these standards from their corresponding legal requirements.
These business practices are also employment policies, and each of
these standards implicate a raft of federal, state, and local employ-
ment laws that impose various legal 6bligations on the employer.
1. Hiring/Appearance Standards
Franchisor hiring and appearance restrictions may implicate Title
VIP5 and Americans with Disability Act ("ADA") 86 regulation of
prehire inquiries. Franchisor requirements, for example, that franchis-
ees conduct criminal background checks when hiring franchise store
83 WElL, supra note 4, at 9.
84 See, e.g., Josh Kosman, Schneiderman Wins $800K in Back Wages, Eyes Parent Suit,
N.Y. PosT (Feb. 1, 2015), https://nypost.com/2015/02/01/schneiderman-wins-800k-in-back-wages-
eyes-parent-suit/ [https://perma.cc/625U-YVTN] (quoting franchisee subject to wage-and-hour
judgment that he was unaware of the overtime requirements of wage-and-hour law).
85 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
86 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 and 47 U.S.C.).
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employees87 implicate the Title VII prohibition on employment prac-
tices that have an adverse impact on a protected class unless the prac-
tice is justified by business necessity.88 Courts have found that the
blanket rejection of applications based on arrests without convictions
or a single previous conviction may violate Title VII.89 Many state and
local jurisdictions go further and ban pre-interview criminal record in-
quiries and require consideration of a variety of factors before re-
jecting an applicant because of a past criminal conviction.90
Franchisors also often impose appearance standards on franchise
store employees that implicate antidiscrimination law. Franchisor
grooming requirements restricting employee hair or facial hair may
violate Title VII because of a disparate impact on African-American
men, who disproportionately cannot shave because of a skin condi-
tion,91 or may violate Title VII's prohibition of religious discrimina-
tion92 if the employer fails to grant a reasonable accommodation to
employees who wear beards as a religious practice.93
2. Pay Policies and Job Functions
Franchisor MIS systems that provide payroll systems to franchis-
ees may facilitate violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA") and many state wage-and-hour laws. Franchisors often re-
quire franchisees to purchase computer equipment and software to
track the hours worked by store employees that contain payroll pro-
87 See, e.g., Reese v. Coastal Restoration & Cleaning Servs., Inc., No. 1:10cv36-RHW, 2010
WL 5184841, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2010) (discussing franchisor requirement that franchisee
conduct criminal background checks for all employees every two years and "not to employ any-
one with a conviction for a felony or any type of assault").
88 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (k) (2012).
89 See Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1293, 1298-99 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding
employer's policy of denying employment to applicants who have been convicted of "any of-
fense, except a minor traffic offense" violated Title VII); Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F.
Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (finding discharge based on arrest records was unlawful).
90 See Andrew Elmore, Civil Disabilities in an Era of Diminishing Privacy: A Disability
Approach for the Use of Criminal Records in Hiring, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 991, 995, 1014-15
(2015).
91 See Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993) (ordering injunction
requiring that franchisor's no-beard policy recognize an exception for African-American males
with pseudofolliculitis barbae).
92 Title VII requires that employers grant reasonable religious accommodations that do
not cause an undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
93 Consent Decree at 2, EEOC v. Family Foods, Inc., 2012 WL 3060635 (E.D.N.C. April
30, 2012) (No. 5:11-cv-00394) (stating Taco Bell franchisee must pay $27,000 to resolve religious
discrimination complaint by employee for refusal to accommodate his religion in franchisee's
policy).
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grams to calculate gross wages owed to these employees.9 4 Using
franchisor software as a payroll system, however, requires franchisees
to independently account not only for overtime but also for any wage
premiums owed for single-day shifts, such as required meal and rest
breaks, and split shifts or shifts spread over long periods of time, and
combine all hours worked in different franchise stores in a single week
to correctly report these wage premiums.9 5
Business systems that require franchise store employees to per-
form delivery services create additional payroll and safety and health
obligations. The use of a tip credit, or an employer deduction of the
employee's base wage by a certain amount that the employee earns in
tips, is lawful under federal and most state wage-and-hour laws and is
common in delivery systems. For tipped employees whose franchisees
claim a tip credit, however, the payroll system would need to account
for the lawful minimum and overtime wage in applying the tip credit,
and could not apply the tip credit to nontipped responsibilities.96 Busi-
ness models that require employees to own and use their own vehicles
to perform deliveries additionally require employers to provide safety
equipment to employees and to correctly calculate and reimburse em-
ployees for delivery expenses.97
To observe that required franchisor personnel standards inevita-
bly bump up against employment laws is not to suggest that the
franchisor has no legitimate interest in these terms. To the contrary,
customer satisfaction in the service sector depends on customer ser-
94 See, e.g., Domino's Cookston Aff., supra note 44, paras. 16, 20-25; Domino's Sharma
Aff., supra note 42, paras. 7, 24 (alleging that franchisor required franchisees to use a payroll
report to calculate wages for their employees).
95 See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 226.7, 512, 1198 (West 2011) (explaining required meal and rest
breaks under California law).
96 29 C.F.R. § 531.59(b) (2017) ("[T]he tip credit may be taken only for hours worked by
the employee in an occupation in which the employee qualifies as a 'tipped employee."').
97 FLSA, in particular, requires that employers pay employees "free and clear," and pro-
hibits employers from requiring employees to "kick-back" wages in the form of paying for tools
or equipment for work if they result in payments less than the legally entitled minimum or over-
time wages. 29 C.F.R. § 531.35 (2017). Although courts have permitted employers to use a rea-
sonable approximation of these expenses, Morangelli v. Chemed Corp., 922 F. Supp. 2d 278, 301,
316 (E.D.N.Y. 2013), reimbursement for automobile usage should include gas, wear and tear, the
proportional cost of repairs and replacements, and depreciation. See Perrin v. Papa John's Int'l,
Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1152 (E.D. Mo. 2011). Franchisor requirements that franchise store
employees engage in potentially dangerous work, particularly under timed conditions, also impli-
cate federal and state occupational safety and health requirements. New York City, for example,
requires employers to provide bicycle delivery personnel with adequate helmets, lights, bell or
other sound device, brakes, reflective tires, reflective jacket or vest, and employers must ensure
that all delivery personnel complete a bicycle safety course. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE 10-
157(a), (b), (e), (i) (2017) (citing 16 C.F.R. pt. 1203).
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vice, and franchise store employees ultimately provide the goods and
services that customers associate with the franchisor. Imposing these
requirements without ensuring compliance with the associated legal
requirements can result in their violation, even assuming the fran-
chisee's good faith intention to comply.
Litigation against franchisors claiming their joint responsibility
for employment law violations in franchise stores suggest that the
franchisor's required business process, including hiring, appearance,
and pay standards and recommendations, may encourage violations of
employment law. In Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska,98 the Eighth Cir-
cuit enjoined Domino's Pizza's no-beard requirement for franchise
store employees because of its disparate impact on African-American
men, half of whom suffer from pseudofolliculitis barbae, a skin condi-
tion that will not permit them to shave.99 In EEOC v. Papin Enter-
prises, Inc.,too a trial court denied summary judgment to Subway and
its franchisee, finding that refusal to exempt a franchise store em-
ployee from a franchisor-required appearance standard could consti-
tute a failure to accommodate her religious beliefs under Title VII.
01
Delivery employees have successfully sued franchisees of Pizza Hut,
Papa John's, and Domino's Pizza for failure to appropriately apply the
tip credit or to reimburse them for employer-required delivery ex-
penses.102 Recent litigation against three different franchisors claim
that the MIS systems they require their franchisees to use to track
franchise store employees' hours worked included flaws that underre-
port wages owed to franchise store employees.103
Setting aside the merits of those complaints and their joint em-
ployer arguments, which will be addressed in the next Part, these cases
98 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993).
99 Id. at 799.
100 No. 6:07-cv-01548-Orl-28GJK, 2009 WL 961108 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2009).
101 Id. at *1.
102 See Smith v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 09-CV-01632-CMA-BNB, 2013 WL 1751850 (D. Colo.
Apr. 23, 2013); Kirtright v. Holiday Delta, Inc., No. 7:09-CV-184-BO, 2010 BL 311330 (E.D.N.C.
Dec. 30, 2010) (approving settlement with Domino's franchisees); Bass v. PJCOMN Acquisition
Corp., No. 09-cv-01614-REB-MEH, 2010 WL 3767132 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2010).
103 See Ochoa v. McDonald's Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1237 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting
that McDonald's payroll program failed to calculate owed wages for required meal and rest
breaks required under California law); Aleksick v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 205 Cal. App. 4th 1176, 1180
(Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (noting that 7-Eleven payroll program allegedly shaved minute portions of
shifts from daily payroll calculations); Affirmation of Terri Gerstein in Support of Verified Peti-
tion paras. 91-118, People v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No. 450627/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 23, 2016)
[hereinafter Domino's Gerstein Aff. Supp. V. Pet.] (noting Domino's payroll program under
calculated owed wages for employees whose employers claimed a "tip credit," and also failed to
calculate shift premiums under New York law).
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show how the franchisor's dependency, control, and loyalty measures
can encourage employment law violations in franchise stores.
The risk of reputational harm to the franchisor created by fran-
chisee employment law violations, particularly for legal obligations
triggered by franchisor required and recommended standards and
tools, would seem to create an incentive for franchisors to monitor
employment law compliance and to cure violations. Franchisors,
which are often sophisticated and operate their own stores, have ex-
pertise in using their own business systems and processes in a way that
complies with employment law. It is in the reputational interests of
firms, particularly in the service sector, that customers associate their
brands with stores that operate in a legally compliant manner. It is
also unsurprising that franchisees, particularly those that are judgment
proof, would be unable or unwilling to comply with the technical em-
ployment law requirements triggered by a franchisor's required or rec-
ommended personnel policy or tool. Yet, although some franchisors
provide franchisees with access to generic information about employ-
ment law compliance, they typically withhold legal compliance sup-
port related to specific required and recommended personnel policies
and tools, and they do not monitor employment law compliance.104
Understanding why it is that franchisors do not monitor franchise
stores for employment law compliance requires an exploration of the
joint employer doctrine, the legal doctrine that holds multiple entities
in a production process jointly and severally liable as joint employers
if they codetermine the terms and conditions of employees in a work-
place. The next Part argues that the lack of franchisor legal compli-
ance measures in franchise stores reflects a judicial failure to consider
the ways that franchisors protect their brand in the joint employer
analysis. It will show that courts often limit the joint employer doc-
trine in franchising to only hold franchisors liable if they exert direct
control over the workplace. Perversely, a control-based joint em-
ployer doctrine may permit franchisors to impose standards that en-
courage employment law violations but discourage franchisors from
taking control-based measures to monitor employment law compli-
ance and cure violations. Even a broader test that accounts for the
franchisee's dependency on and loyalty to the franchisor would not
consider the franchisor-franchise store employee relationship or pro-
vide a liability standard for policies and business tools that can en-
courage employment law violations. This suggests the need, explored
104 Ji & Weil, supra note 10, at 34-36
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in Part III, for new liability standards to deter franchisor practices that
may mask or encourage employment law violations.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE JOINT EMPLOYER DOCTRINE TO TAKE
ACCOUNT OF THE IMPLICIT PROMISES IN FRANCHISING
THAT CAN MASK AND ENCOURAGE
EMPLOYMENT LAw VIOLATIONS
Employment law traditionally deters violations by subcontractors
by extending joint employer, or joint and several, liability to all enti-
ties that control the workplace.105 But historically, borrowing from
common law vicarious liability standards, courts have limited joint
employer liability to franchisors that exercise day-to-day supervision
over franchise stores or that control the policy or business tool that
causes the harm.106 Because franchisees must directly supervise store
operations and have final authority to implement policies under the
franchise agreement, this narrow interpretation of the joint employer
doctrine has effectively created a presumption in franchising that fran-
chisees are independent contractors, and that franchisors are not joint
employers. In response, courts have faced increasing calls to broaden
the joint employer doctrine to account for franchisor measures to con-
trol franchise store operations other than direct control of franchise
store employees.
This Part introduces and critiques the current, narrow joint em-
ployer rule for franchising. By only considering direct franchisor con-
trol over the workplace as evidence of joint employment, the right to
control test fails to account for the franchisee's dependency on and
loyalty to the franchisor in adopting optional, franchisor-recom-
mended policies and business tools. Even a broader version of the
joint employer test, while recognizing the franchisor measures that
make these standards and tools effectively mandatory for franchisees,
105 See, e.g., Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 134 (4th Cir. 2017).
106 These courts often adopt a narrow interpretation of joint employer liability, requiring a
showing that franchisors exercise day-to-day supervision of the workplace. See, e.g., Ochoa, 133
F. Supp. 3d at 1235-39 (disregarding "the welter of... facts" showing McDonald's "strength as a
franchisor," including its power to unilaterally sanction the franchisee and terminate the
franchise agreement, "recommendations" about crew scheduling and staffing, extensive monitor-
ing, required training and use of scheduling and payroll programs, as evidence of an employment
relationship); Reese v. Coastal Restoration & Cleaning Servs., Inc., No. 1:10cv36-RHW, 2010
WL 5184841, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2010) (noting that a contractual provision in the franchise
agreement "is simply one of the quality control standards" imposed by the franchisor and that it
"does not show that [the franchisor] has power to control hiring/firing of [franchisee] employ-
ees"); Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 333 P.3d 723, 743 (Cal. 2014) (granting summary judg-
ment against plaintiff in a state sex harassment case on the issue of Domino's joint liability).
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would not address the ways that franchising can create a psychological
contract between franchisors and franchise store employees, and has
yet to define an outer boundary of franchisor liability for policies that
trigger employment law obligations. This Part will conclude that rec-
ognizing the implicit promises in franchising-that franchisees may
grow their business, and franchise store employees may work in a sta-
ble, well-run workplace if they champion the brand to the consumer-
will require emergent apparent agency and misrepresentation theories
of franchisor liability that do not depend on a joint employer
determination.1 0 7
A. The Right to Control Limitation to Joint Employment for
Franchisors
Courts historically evaluate joint employer claims against
franchisors by using a narrow right to control standard developed
from the common law vicarious liability doctrine.1 08 Under this doc-
trine, a franchisor may be vicariously liable for the harms caused in
franchise stores if the franchisor "has control or the right to control
the physical conduct of the agent such that a master/servant relation-
ship can be said to exist."109 Most courts narrowly construe this right
to control test in franchising, requiring plaintiffs to produce evidence
that the franchisor exerts "control over a franchisee's performance of
its day-to-day operations,"n0 in order to establish the franchisor's vi-
carious liability. Under this narrow right to control test, courts exclude
evidence of control designed to ensure "uniformity and standardiza-
107 See Stone, supra note 17, at 590-92 (arguing that recognizing the implicit promise by
employers of training and future employability in return for employee loyalty would require
courts to reassess doctrines that permit employers to restrict future employment).
108 E.g., Rainey v. Langen, 998 A.2d 342, 347 (Me. 2010). The traditional rule for determin-
ing whether an economic relationship is legally sufficient to impose liability on a principal in a
contracting arrangement derives from the master-servant doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (listing ten factors to determine whether there is a
master-servant agency relationship, including (1) the employer's right to control the details of
the work, (2) whether the putative agent is employed in a distinct business or occupation, (3) the
method of payment used, and (4) whether the employer supplies the instrumentalities needed
for the job). Courts have integrated this common law test into restrictive versions of the joint
employer test in statutes. The best known of these versions is from Bonnette v. California Health
and Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983), which considered "whether the alleged em-
ployer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee
work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment,
and (4) maintained employment records." Id. at 1470.
109 Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Wis. 2004).
110 Rainey, 998 A.2d at 347-49.
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tion of products and services"111 as inherent in the franchise relation-
ship. As an even narrower version of this rule, some courts
additionally impose an "instrumentality" element. This requires plain-
tiffs to show "the right to control the daily conduct or operation of the
particular 'instrumentality' or aspect of the franchisee's business that
is alleged to have caused the harm before vicarious liability may be
imposed on the franchisor for the franchisee's tortious conduct."1 1 2
Courts routinely incorporate the right to control requirements
into the joint employer standards of employment statutes. This has led
the majority of courts to find that franchisors are not joint employers
because they do not exercise day-to-day supervision over franchise
stores.113 Where franchisors have been found to be joint employers,
courts have generally limited liability to instances in which the
franchisor directly controls franchise store employees or directs the
franchisee to adopt a policy that facially violates an employment law
standard. As an example of the first, in Miller v. D.F. Zee's, Inc. ,114 an
111 Little v. Howard Johnson Co., 455 N.W.2d 390, 394 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
112 Kerl, 682 N.W.2d at 340. In Kerl, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on the instrumen-
tality theory to affirm dismissal of a vicarious liability claim against a franchisor for negligent
supervision of an employee who shot and killed two individuals in a parking lot across the street
from the franchise store. Id. at 332-33, 342. In that case, the court affirmed judgment for the
franchisor because the plaintiff could not show that the franchisor "controlled or had the right to
control [the franchisee's] hiring and supervision of employees, which is the aspect of [fran-
chisee's] business that is alleged to have caused the plaintiff's harm." Id. at 342.
113 See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, 162 F.3d 1062, 1071 (10th Cir. 1998) (reversing judgment
against franchisor as a joint employer because of no evidence of control over day-to-day employ-
ment decisions); Evans v. McDonald's Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1991) (dismissing
Title VII joint employer claim because "McDonald's did not have control over [franchisee's]
labor relations with his franchise employees"); McFarland v. Breads of the World, LLC, No.
1:09-cv-929, 2011 WL 801815, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 1, 2011) (rejecting joint employer claim
where the franchisor played no role in the franchisee's "employee relations issues, including but
not limited to the day-to-day supervision of [the franchisee's] employees"); McLaurin v. Fusco,
629 F. Supp. 2d 657, 663 (S.D. Miss. 2009) (same); Matthews v. Int'l House of Pancakes, 597 F.
Supp. 2d 663, 671 (E.D. La. 2009) (dismissing Title VII claim because franchisee "has always
been solely responsible for ... day-to-day operations"); Singh v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. C-05-04534
RMW, 2007 WL 715488, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007) (holding that franchisor was not a joint
employer under the FLSA because "7-Eleven was not responsible for setting plaintiffs' wages,
using its funds to pay plaintiffs, or providing any employment benefits," and did not establish an
employment relationship); Baetzel v. Home Instead Senior Care, 370 F. Supp. 2d 631, 641-42
(N.D. Ohio 2005) (dismissing a Title VII claim against a franchisor as a joint employer because
the franchisor lacked "day-to-day" operational control); Alberter v. McDonald's Corp., 70 F.
Supp. 2d 1138, 1143-44 (D. Nev. 1999) (dismissing Title VII joint employer claim on ground that
franchisee was responsible for day-to-day operation and had final authority over employment
matters); Froedtert Mem'l Lutheran Hosp., Inc., 20 BNA OSHC 1500 (No. 97-1839, 2004) (ap-
plying "common-law agency doctrine to determine whether a conventional master-servant rela-
tionship exists" in a joint employer test under OSH Act).
114 31 F. Supp. 2d 792 (D. Or. 1998).
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Oregon trial court denied summary judgment for a franchisor in a
joint employer claim of sex discrimination and harassment under Title
VII.115 In D.F. Zee's, the court found evidence of a right to control in
the franchisor's detailed, mandatory standards that it monitored and
policed, which required store employee training and the right to disci-
pline employees, including based on claims of discrimination.116 As an
example of the second, in EEOC v. Papin Enterprises, Inc. ,117 a trial
court found the "instrumentality" element met by Subway's require-
ment that franchise store employees refrain from wearing facial jew-
elry, which required the franchisee to deny the plaintiff's requested
religious accommodation.118 The court held that the required appear-
ance policy was "evidence that the franchisor had some power over,
and became involved in, a specific dispute regarding terms and condi-
tions of employment" central to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's ("EEOC") claim that the franchise store failed to ac-
commodate the store employee's religion.119
The right to control test focus on the franchisor's day-to-day su-
pervision of the franchise store employee and practices that cause the
complained-of violations,12 0 however, fails to account for the depen-
dency, control, and loyalty measures that franchisors use to ensure
brand uniformity, including those that may mask or encourage em-
ployment law violations. In Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, LLC, 121 for
example, considering a state antidiscrimination law with the same
joint employer standard as Title VII, the California Supreme Court
rejected a joint employer claim on the ground that the franchisor did
not have the "right to control" the franchise store employees, despite
evidence suggesting the franchisor's deep involvement in the franchise
store's operation.122 In that instance, the court found that the franchise
115 Id. at 797.
116 Id. at 802, 807.
117 No. 6:07-cv-01548-Orl-28GJK, 2009 WL 961108 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2009).
118 Id. at *6.
119 Id. at *9; see also Myers v. Garfield & Johnson Enters., 679 F. Supp. 2d 598, 609-10
(E.D. Pa. 2010) (holding that franchisor's "Code of Conduct" prohibiting harassment and al-
leged right to promulgate work rules, train franchisee managers, and terminate employees for
violating code of conduct sufficed to defeat a motion to dismiss the Title VII claim against the
franchisor as a joint employer).
120 See, e.g., Wu v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 83, 94 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting
franchise store employee's vicarious liability claim against franchisor for workplace injuries
based on failure of franchisor-mandated security system to protect employee from injury be-
cause franchisor was not at fault for the specific lapse that led to plaintiff's injury).
121 333 P.3d 723 (Cal. 2014).
122 Id. at 726, 739 (holding that the joint employer standard requires a showing that the
franchisor "has retained or assumed a general right of control over factors such as hiring, direc-
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
agreement, which stated that the franchisee is an independent con-
tractor, and the franchisor's lack of day-to-day supervision and
"hands-off" approach to sexual harassment allowed no reasonable in-
ference of a joint employer relationship.123 Notably, the court ignored
evidence of the franchisee's dependency on and loyalty to the
franchisor's recommendations, rejecting evidence that the franchisor
representative told the franchisee to "get rid" of the plaintiff in retali-
ation for her complaint of sexual harassment because "no reasonable
inference can be drawn that it was intended or interpreted to mean
that [the franchisee] had no choice in the matter, that [the franchisor]
was in charge, or that consequences would ensue if [the franchisee]
did not follow [the franchisor's] advice."124
Patterson's disregard of franchisee dependency on and loyalty to
the franchisor is reflected in other cases that adopt the right to control
limitation in franchise joint employer cases. In Orozco v. Plackis,125
the Fifth Circuit relied on the right to control test to reverse a jury
determination that a franchisor was a joint employer in a wage-and-
hour suit.1 26 The Fifth Circuit, in finding dispositive the lack of day-to-
day supervision by the franchisor, discounted evidence of franchisor
meetings with the franchisee to recommend staffing and other opera-
tional changes that the franchisee adopted as mere "advice" and "sug-
gested improvements" rather than evidence of control.127 It found that
required training and policies and personnel recommendations could
not, as a matter of law, create a joint employment relationship in light
of terms in the franchise agreement disclaiming franchisor authority
over franchisee stores.1 28 Similarly, in Alberter v. McDonald's Corp. ,129
a Nevada district court relied on the right to control test to reject the
argument that the McDonald's franchise agreement, which required
the franchisee to adopt the franchisor's policies and business tools,
showed the right to control sufficient to establish a joint employer re-
lationship.1 30 That court reasoned that the franchisee's uncontested
tion, supervision, discipline, discharge, and relevant day-to-day aspects of the workplace behav-
ior of the franchisee's employees").
123 See id. at 739.
124 Id. at 730, 742.
125 757 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2014).
126 See id. at 452.
127 Id. at 450.
128 See id. at 449-52.
129 70 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Nev. 1999).
130 See id. at 1144-45 (dismissing Title VII sexual harassment action against McDonald's,
finding that the franchise agreement, which required that the franchisee "promptly adopt and
use exclusively the formulas, methods and policies contained in the business manuals, now and
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day-to-day supervision over the workplace and ability to set employ-
ment policies notwithstanding the franchise agreement evidenced the
franchisee's sole employment of franchise store employees.131 Lack of
day-to-day supervision also required dismissal of a joint employer
claim in Ochoa v. McDonald's Corp.,132 a California trial court found,
despite evidence of the franchisor's "considerable pressure" on fran-
chisees to adopt personnel scheduling and staffing policies, required
training, monitoring, equipment, materials and uniforms, status as
landlord of the store premises, and required management information
software.1 33
Other courts have relied on the instrumentality rationale to reject
franchisor general policies that trigger legal obligations as indicia of
control absent evidence that the policies themselves caused employ-
ment law violations. In Reese v. Coastal Restoration and Cleaning Ser-
vices,1 3 4 a Mississippi district court rejected as evidence of control a
background check requirement in which the franchisor required the
franchisee to conduct a background check every two years and "not to
employ anyone with a conviction for a felony or any type of as-
sault."1 3 5 That court held that the franchisor's background check pol-
icy was a "quality control standard" rather than the kind of policy that
shows "power to control hiring/firing" of franchise store employees.13 6
Lack of control over the instrumentality in Singh v. 7-Eleven, Inc.1 3 7
led the court to disregard the franchisor's payroll services as "merely a
convenience" to franchisees and not evidence of joint employment in
a claim that paychecks to franchise store employees did not include
owed overtime and meal-break compensation.1 38
These cases show how the right to control test fails to reflect the
relationships between franchisors and franchisees and franchise store
employees. Discounting franchisor-required operational policies as
as they may be modified by" McDonald's, did not "establish control by McDonald's over em-
ployment matters at" the franchise store).
131 See id. at 1143-45.
132 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
133 Id. at 1235-37.
134 No. 1:10cv36-RHW, 2010 WL 5184841 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2010).
135 Id. at *4.
136 Id. (rejecting additionally as evidence of control a provision in the franchise license
agreement requiring "vehicles, equipment, supplies, cleaning products, uniforms, computer
hardware and software" to meet the franchisor's standards).
137 No. C-05-04534 RMW, 2007 WL 715488 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2007).
138 Id. at *6 (holding that franchisor was not a joint employer under the FLSA because "7-
Eleven was not responsible for setting plaintiffs' wages, using its funds to pay plaintiffs, or pro-
viding any employment benefits").
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evidence of control because the franchisor is not present in the work-
site to implement them ignores the franchisee's heavy incentives to
implement them because of its dependency on and loyalty to the
franchisor.139 Rejecting evidence of a franchisor's policies that trigger
employment law obligations as mere "recommendations" ignores the
franchisee's loyalty to the franchisor that leads the franchisee to adopt
recommendations in order to protect the franchisee's survival and fu-
ture growth within the franchisor's network.140 The restrictive causa-
tion requirement in the "instrumentality" test ignores the
sophistication of franchisors, who are aware of the legal obligations
triggered by a policy because they comply with them in their own
units, and the comparable lack of franchisee sophistication.141
The right to control test also fails to address-and can magnify-
the franchisor's incentives to impose standards that can encourage
employment law violations in franchise stores. It imposes no sanction
on franchisors for imposing policies that encourage employment law
violations or taking no action to deter violations, yet does sanction
franchisors for taking control-based actions to induce precaution in
the form of strict liability for any harm that ensues.142 Under these
rules, as in D.F. Zee's and Papin Enterprises, in which franchisor lia-
bility hinged on direct franchisor supervision, the most cost-effective
solution is for the franchisor to require the same policy but disclaim
ultimate authority and take fewer precautions to deter employment
law liabilities.143 It, moreover, removes the reputational harm of em-
ployment law violations in franchise stores because franchisors may
claim, with judicial approval, that franchisees are independent con-
tractors responsible for their own employment practices.144 This mar-
ket failure can occur even if franchisors are best positioned to take
139 The dependency of franchisees on franchisors to recoup upfront fees and maintain their
store ownership permits franchisors to impose standards even if they are in conflict with the
franchisee's interests, with few corresponding franchisor obligations to the franchisee in return.
See Hadfield, supra note 1, at 929-30, 933-37.
140 BRADACH, supra note 1, at 69-70; see also Hanks, supra note 43, at 28.
141 The fifty largest franchisors account for ninety-eight percent "of the market capitaliza-
tion of all U.S. public companies engaged in business format franchising." Jeff Feingold, Krispy
Kreme Rebounds in UNH Franchise Index, N.H. Bus. REv. (June 8,2006), http://www.nhbr.com/
May-26-2006/Krispy-Kreme-rebounds-in-UNH-franchise-index/ [https://perma.cc/CDW6-
K7LH]; see supra note 61.
142 See Jennifer H. Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Beyond Master-Servant: A Critique of
Vicarious Liability, in EXPLORING TORT LAw 111, 113-12 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005).
143 See supra notes 114-19.
144 See Emerson, supra note 36, at 675, 682 (seventy-four of one hundred franchise agree-
ments sampled by author stated that the franchisee was an independent contractor and not an
agent).
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appropriate action to prevent employment law violations themselves
and to induce franchisees to take precautionary care.14 5 It also does
not address the incentive for franchisors to select franchisees who vio-
late employment laws and who are judgment proof.146
In short, the current restrictive right to control test in the joint
employer doctrine fails to account for the franchisor's relationships
with franchisees and franchise store employees and can have the per-
verse effect of encouraging employment law violations in franchise
stores.
B. Improving the Franchisor's Standard of Care by Broadening the
Joint Employer Definition of Control
The recent surge in joint employer litigation in franchising fueled
by the Fight for Fifteen movement1 47 has led courts to reexamine
whether franchisors are joint employers under a broader joint em-
ployer test that would consider forms of remote and indirect control
common in franchising. This Section finds that although a broader
joint employer claim would recognize the dependency and control
measures in the franchisor-franchisee relationship, it would not recog-
nize the loyalty measures that create implicit promises between
145 See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 142, at 112-13 (explaining that because firms have
access to a number of tools to regulate agents, they are often better equipped than courts to
regulate the precautions of agents).
146 Competitive forces benefit judgment-proof agents because they bear no costs for any
harm they cause and thus can perform tasks at more competitive prices than agents that must
internalize the cost of liability. See id. at 113.
147 William Finnegan, Dignity: Fast-Food Workers and a New Form of Labor Activism,
NEw YORKER (Sep. 15, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/15/dignity-4
[https://perma.cc/QAP9-2JTJ]; see Andrew Elmore, The Future of Fast Food Governance, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 73 (2017). In response to complaints received by the Fight for Fifteen
movement, the NLRB announced that it would consider McDonald's to be a joint employer with
its franchisees subject to unfair labor practice complaints, and the New York Attorney General
filed suit against Domino's Pizza, now pending, claiming that it is a joint employer under wage-
and-hour law. See Press Release, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., NLRB Office of the General Coun-
sel Authorizes Complaints Against McDonald's Franchisees and Determines McDonald's, USA,
LLC is a Joint Employer (July 29, 2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-
office-general-counsel-authorizes-complaints-against-mcdonalds [https://perma.cc/NB44-F354];
see also V. Pet. for N.Y., supra note 41. The McDonald's dispute is pending before an NLRB
administrative law judge and may be resolved by a proposed settlement, brokered by the new
NLRB General Counsel, without reaching a decision on whether McDonald's is a joint em-
ployer. See Press Release, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., Proposed Settlement Agreements
Presented in McDonald's USA, LLC, et al. (March 20, 2018), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-out-
reach/news-story/proposed-settlement-agreements-presented-mcdonald%E2%80%99s-usa-lle-
et-al [https://perma.cc/5YSJ-F24D]; Noam Scheiber, Push to Settle McDonald's Case, a Threat to
Franchise Model, N.Y. TIMES (March 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/business/
economy/mcdonalds-labor.html [https://perma.cc/JQ9P-TX8F].
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franchisors, franchisees, and franchise store employees to protect the
franchisor's brand. To account for these measures, third-party liability
claims will be necessary to regulate the specific representations by
franchisors that may mask or encourage employment law violations in
franchise stores.
Under a broad interpretation of the joint employer standard, as
the Fourth Circuit explained in Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc. ,148
the question is whether the putative joint employer "codetermine[s]-
formally or informally, directly or indirectly-the essential terms and
conditions of the worker's employment."149 Perhaps the most recent
famous articulation of this standard comes from the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB") decision Browning-Ferris Industries of
California, Inc.,150 in which firms are joint employers "if they share or
codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and condi-
tions of employment."1 51 Unlike the standard commonly used in
franchising, which restrictively defines "control" as day-to-day super-
vision, this standard would consider indirect and remote forms of con-
trol. As in Carrillo v. Schneider Logistics Trans-Loading and
Distribution, Inc.152-in which a court held that Wal-Mart could be a
joint employer of its warehousing subcontractor's employees-when
presented with evidence of franchisor policy suggestions, a broader
rule would inquire whether the franchisor's expectation was that the
franchisee "would follow these suggestions."153 Instead of the strict
causation requirement of the instrumentality rule, in a broader test,
allegations that a franchisor policy encouraged employment law viola-
tions are a factor that may weigh in favor of a joint employer
determination.154
As a seminal example of this emerging, broader standard, in
Cano v. DPNY, Inc.,15 s a federal court rejected a narrow interpreta-
tion of the joint employer doctrine and expressly considered required
148 848 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2017).
149 Id. at 141. This standard has been used by courts considering contractual arrangements
in a variety of industries. See, e.g., Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 61, 69-72, 77 (2d Cir.
2003) (garment); Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633, 642-44 (9th Cir. 1997) (agriculture).
150 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (2015).
151 Id. at 15.
152 No. 2:11-cv-8557-CAS (DTBx), 2014 WL 183956 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014).
153 Id. at *8.
154 See Flemming v. REM Connecticut Cmty. Servs., No. 3:11cv689 (JBA), 2012 WL
6681862, at *6 (D. Conn. Nov. 13, 2014) (holding a contractor's alleged incorrect designation of
managers as exempt from overtime requirements was sufficient, along with other factors, to
defeat the contractor's motion to dismiss a joint employer claim).
155 287 F.R.D. 251 (S.D.N.Y 2012).
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but indirect and remote franchisor policies as evidence of control.156
Specifically, it held that allegations that a franchisor, Domino's Pizza,
promulgates compensation policies and implements them through a
required payroll system-which the franchisor uses to track franchise
store payroll and store personnel performance as well as required
management, operation, hiring, and inspection policies-are sufficient
to state a claim that the franchisor is jointly liable for wage-and-hour
law violations as a joint employer.157 Many courts have followed the
reasoning in Cano and have denied franchisor motions to dismiss on
similar allegations.158
Cano and later cases have shown how a broader standard would
account for the franchisor's control measures, which are indirect and
remote, and the franchisee's dependency on and loyalty to the
franchisor, which may effectively require a seemingly discretionary
recommendation or business tool. Extending joint and several liability
to large, sophisticated franchisors that indirectly and remotely control
franchise store operations is likely to improve employment law com-
pliance in those franchise stores by providing an incentive for these
franchisors to monitor their franchise stores to prevent and cure em-
ployment law violations.
But in restricting its analysis to the franchisor-franchisee relation-
ship,159 a broad joint employer standard still tends to disregard the
franchisor's relationship with franchise store employees. It also does
not draw an outer boundary of franchisor liability for its policies that
may trigger employment law violations.160 Thus, a broader joint em-
ployer test is likely to improve legal compliance in some instances but
156 See id. at 260.
157 Id.
158 See, e.g., Lora v. Ledo Pizza Sys., Inc., No. DKC 16-4002, 2017 WL 3189406, at *7-9 (D.
Md. July 27, 2017); Ocampo v. 455 Hospitality LLC, No. 14-CV-9614(KMK), 2016 WL 4926204,
at *7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2016); Cordova v. SCCF, Inc., No. 13CIV5665-LTS-HP, 2014 WL
3512838, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2014); Olvera v. Bareburger Group LLC, 73 F. Supp. 3d 201,
207 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). To be sure, many courts have continued to use a narrow standard to find
that franchisors are not joint employers of franchise store employees. See, e.g., Pope v. Espeseth,
Inc., 228 F. Supp. 3d 884, 889-91 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (rejecting evidence of a suggested compensa-
tion rate because the evidence that the franchisee was required to adopt it was lacking); Wright
v. Mountain View Lawn Care, LLC, No. 7:15-cv-00224, 2016 WL 1060341, at *6 (W.D. Va. Mar.
11, 2016) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that franchisee depended on franchisor, which con-
trolled franchisee's operations, because "this is not the relevant inquiry in the joint employment
analysis").
159 See Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 141 (4th Cir. 2017) (observing
that the joint employer "codetermination" standard evaluates the relationship between the con-
tractor and subcontractor, not those parties and the putative employee).
160 See Hyde, supra note 16, at 414-16.
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would not recognize the franchisor's implicit promises to franchisees
and franchise store employees that may mask or encourage employ-
ment law violations. Even those franchisors that could be considered
joint employers under a broad standard are likely to restructure oper-
ations to avoid liability instead of taking measures to improve
compliance.161
It is impossible, moreover, to ignore the political backlash that
has accompanied attempts to broaden the joint employer doctrine in
franchising. After the 2015 NLRB decision in Browning-Ferris Indus-
tries of California, in which the NLRB adopted a broad joint employer
standard for the National Labor Relations Act ("NRLA"),1 62
franchisors responded by successfully lobbying for legislation that lim-
its franchisor liability. To date, nine states have adopted the
franchisors' model legislation exempting franchisors from employ-
ment law liability as joint employers of franchise store employees.16 3
The U.S. House of Representatives recently passed the Save Local
Business Act, which would amend the FLSA and NLRA joint em-
ployer tests, codifying the narrow right to control test.164 Most re-
cently, the NLRB in Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd. 65 sought
to reverse Browning-Ferris and reinstitute a narrower joint employer
test that would exclude franchisors from NLRA's reach.166 The NLRB
withdrew Hy-Brand amid criticism that a board member participating
in the decision had a conflict of interest, and Browning-Ferris remains
the current NLRB statement on the NLRA joint employer stan-
161 See Elmore, supra note 147, at 88-89 (arguing that franchisors are likely to respond to
concerns of joint employer, apparent agency, and misrepresentation/franchise law liability by
distancing themselves further from franchisees' personnel policies, increasing the capital require-
ments of franchisees, and by subcontracting monitoring to a third party); see Arlen & MacLeod,
supra note 142, at 130-32.
162 See 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 15-19 (2015).
163 See Proactive Joint Employer Legislation, INT'L FRANCHISE Ass'N, https://
www.franchise.org/proactive-joint-employer-legislation [https://perma.cc/RFD4-G4PS]. For ex-
ample, the Michigan statute provides that "[e]xcept as specifically provided in the franchise
agreement, as between a franchisee and a franchisor, the franchisee is considered the sole em-
ployer of workers for whom the franchisee provides a benefit plan or pays wages." MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 408.471(d) (West 2016). This effectively precludes a franchisor joint employer de-
termination for state wage-and-hour, safety and health, and employment discrimination stan-
dards in these states.
164 Save Local Business Act, H.R. 3441, 115th Cong. (2017). The bill limits joint employer
liability for all contractors-not just franchisors-to those entities that "directly, actually, and
immediately, and not in a limited and routine manner, exercise[] significant control over essen-
tial terms and conditions of employment." Id. at § 2(a)(2).
165 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156 (2017).
166 Id. at 6.
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dard.167 But the NLRB's announced intention to reverse the Brown-
ing-Ferris standard has placed its future in considerable doubt.
Exempting franchisors from joint employer liability, as
franchisors have sought, would likely increase employment law non-
compliance in franchise stores by leaving franchisors free to impose
standards and recommendations on franchisees that trigger employ-
ment law obligations without monitoring legal compliance because
they can externalize the cost of noncompliance to franchisees.168 For
those franchisees who are judgment proof, this effectively shifts the
costs of franchise store employment law violations to franchise store
employees. It would remove the reputational harm to franchisors that
the possibility of liability under a potentially broad joint employer
standard might cause. Whether or not this even narrower standard
becomes the dominant rule, the current impasse, in which franchisors
have countered a broader joint employer rule in franchising with legis-
lative reform to narrow it even further, virtually assures that a uni-
form, broad joint employer standard in franchising is unlikely in the
near term.169
For the near term, and for franchisors near or beyond the outer
boundary of joint employer status, two recent cases, Ochoa v. McDon-
ald's1 7 0 and People v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. ,171 have revealed existing
third-party liability theories that may improve employment law com-
pliance in franchise stores and that do not depend on joint employer
status.172 Plaintiffs in both Ochoa and Domino's Pizza claim that the
franchisors are joint employers based on traditional factors including
the franchisors' comprehensive operational standards and monitoring,
and their direct intervention in the hiring, supervision, discipline, and
termination decisions in franchise stores.1 7 3 But they also assert state
law claims that invoke apparent agency and misrepresentation theo-
ries to extend liability to franchisors based on their dependency, con-
167 See Press Release, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., Board Vacates Hy-Brand Decision (Feb.
26, 2018), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-vacates-hy-brand-decision
[https://perma.cc/V7AQ-8LQZ].
168 See Arlen & MacLeod, supra note 142, at 115.
169 See Hyde, supra note 16, at 414-16 (arguing that one of the most pressing problems in
joint employer litigation is the lack of a categorical rule that can be applied broadly).
170 Ochoa v. McDonald's, 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
171 Verified Petition for New York para. 3, People v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., No. 450627/2016
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 23, 2016).
172 See Ochoa, 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228; V. Pet. for New York, supra note 41.
173 See Ochoa, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 1232-35; V. Pet. for N.Y., supra note 41, at 2; see also
Domino's Gerstein Aff. Supp. V. Pet., supra note 103, paras. 133-61, 180-207.
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trol, and loyalty measures not accounted for in the joint employer
test.174
The next Part will evaluate the theories underlying these claims
and offer them as a means to improve the franchisor's standard of
care.
III. THIRD-PARTY LIABILITY THEORIES TO IMPROVE THE
STANDARD OF CARE IN FRANCHISING
The previous Part has shown that courts in adopting the right to
control standard in joint employer inquiries in franchising ignore the
franchisee's dependency on and loyalty to franchisors and the
franchisor's relationship with franchise store employees. These unique
features of franchising can mask or encourage employment law viola-
tions, while discouraging franchisors from taking precautionary mea-
sures that might evince a joint employer relationship. A broader joint
employer standard would account for the franchisee's loyalty to and
dependency on franchisors, but would still ignore the relationship be-
tween the franchisor and franchise store employee and would not de-
fine a boundary for the franchisor's liability for policies that may
trigger employment law violations.
In response to these shortcomings, employment scholars have ex-
plored the possibility of third-party liability regimes in holding lead
firms responsible for employment law compliance regardless of
whether or not they meet the legal definition of joint employers.'75
Brishen Rogers, discussing the failings of the joint employer doctrine
in imposing responsibility on lead firms to police their subcontractors,
proposes a negligence-based standard of reasonable care on firms that
have considerable discretion over the operation of subordinate firms
in supply chains.176 Alan Hyde, likewise, urges "a standard of respon-
sibility for labor-standards compliance" for parties, like franchisors,
that benefit from labor but are not, or are not easily categorizable as,
employers.77
But calls for expanding contractor liability have thus far failed to
locate an appropriate source of law for third-party liability claims or
174 Ochoa, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 1230-31; V. Pet. for N.Y., supra note 41, paras. 170-74.
175 These proposals flow from a more general criticism of contract principles that enable
parties with a superior bargaining position to contract out liability to judgment-proof agents. See
Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1277-78 (1984); see
also Lynn M. LoPucki, Toward a Trademark-Based Liability System, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1099
(2002) (arguing in favor of imposition of liability for trademark owners including franchisors).
176 See Rogers, supra note 16, at 49-53.
177 Hyde, supra note 16, at 416.
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develop clear boundaries for liability that would improve the
franchisor's standard of care without causing overdeterrence. The
most logical standard, a general negligence standard of reasonable
care necessary to protect third parties, typically only applies to physi-
cal harm7' and where the contractor has reason to know that control
is necessary to prevent harm.179 For the economic harms that are the
subject of employment laws180 and for franchisor policies that may en-
courage but do not require employment law violations, a general neg-
ligence duty cannot be found in existing law.181
Although scholars have identified nondelegable duties under sim-
ilar circumstances,182 existing law does not support a nondelegable
franchisor duty to franchise store employees either. Matthew Bodie
has recently argued that the employment relationship is of a quasi-
fiduciary character, imposing nondelegable duties on employers.18 3
Robert Emerson similarly identifies specific fiduciary duties by
franchisors to franchisees in clauses in franchise agreements under
state franchise law.18 4 To date, however, courts have not recognized a
178 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Can Data Breach Claims Survive the Economic Loss Rule?,
66 DEPAUL L. REV. 339, 349-53 (2017) (discussing majority "economic loss" rule that forecloses
economic losses as the basis of a negligence action, "absent some sort of special relationship that
would warrant imposing on the defendant a duty to act with reasonable care towards those with
whom he is not in a direct relationship").
179 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 317, 323 (AM. LAW INsT. 1965).
180 There are, of course, some employment laws that protect against employee injury and
that can result from the franchisor's direct negligence. See, e.g., Wise v. Ky. Fried Chicken Corp.,
555 F. Supp. 991, 995-96 (D.N.H. 1983) (denying summary judgment to franchisor because
franchisor may have had a duty to warn of risk involved in use of pressure fryer cooker that
injured franchise store employee).
181 See, e.g., Myers v. Garfield & Johnson Enters., 679 F. Supp. 2d 598, 616-17 (E.D. Pa.
2010) (dismissing negligence action in employment discrimination case against franchisor by
franchise employee even though court found sufficient evidence to deny motion to dismiss on
joint employer claim).
182 This is analogous to the nondelegable duty by landlords to prevent negligent repairs by
independent contractors that harm tenants. See, e.g., Dowling v. 257 Assocs., 652 N.Y.S.2d 736,
736 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (noting that municipal law imposes a nondelegable duty on landlords
to maintain a premises in good repair, and holding them vicariously liable for independent con-
tractor negligence in making repairs that harm tenants); Damron v. C.R. Anthony Co., 586
S.W.2d 907, 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (explaining that "the landlord has primary liability for
discharge of the duty and cannot insulate himself from the negligent discharge of the duty by his
independent contractor").
183 See Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 827,
837-45 (2017) (identifying employer duties of workplace safety and privacy, wages, benefits,
discipline, termination, and bargaining as separate duties).
184 Emerson, supra note 62, at 923, 934-43 (arguing that franchisor has a fiduciary duty to
franchisee in various terms of the franchise agreement, including operational standards, in which
franchisees have a reasonable belief that they are purchasing the franchisor's expertise, the
franchisor can exploit information asymmetries for opportunistic gain, the agreement is incom-
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franchisor nondelegable duty to franchise store employees under state
franchise law or any other existing standard.
This Part contributes to this literature by offering two distinct
third-party liability theories, found in existing law, that can address
the unique features of franchising that can mask and encourage em-
ployment law violations. The first, apparent agency, extends liability
for employment law violations to franchisors that franchise store em-
ployees reasonably believe are their coemployers.185 The second, a
misrepresentation theory, would impose liability on franchisors that
require franchisees to adopt personnel standards and business tools
that may encourage employment law violations without ensuring com-
pliance with those standards.186 Scholars who have identified these
theories as significant in franchising187 have not discussed their signifi-
cance in improving employment law compliance in franchise stores.
These claims, although in need of elaboration, offer a framework
through existing law to regulate the franchisor's representations to
franchisees and franchise store employees, notwithstanding the
franchisor's joint employer status.
This Part will first show how apparent agency and misrepresenta-
tion claims, found in common law and in state labor, fraud, and
franchise laws, might better reflect the features of franchising that can
mask and encourage employment law violations in franchise stores. It
will then build on these theories in proposed regulations and address
critiques that franchise regulations that draw from apparent agency
and misrepresentation theories may result in over- or under-
deterrence.
A. Regulating the Franchise Relationship Through Apparent
Agency and Misrepresentation Theories
Apparent agency and misrepresentation claims take account of
the unique ways that franchisors can create a direct relationship with
plete, and, "absent some external motive, the interests of franchisor and franchisee are the
same").
185 See Ochoa v. McDonald's Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1239-40 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (find-
ing that measures by franchisor to instill brand loyalty in franchise store employees can give rise
to an apparent agency claim).
186 See V. Pet. for N.Y., supra note 41, paras. 3-4. (alleging that payroll system provided by
franchisor to franchisees contained flaws that underreported owed wages and that failure to
notify franchisees about these flaws violated state franchise and antimisrepresentation laws).
187 See Robert W. Emerson, Franchisors' Liability When Franchisees Are Apparent Agents:
An Empirical and Policy Analysis of "Common Knowledge" About Franchising, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 609, 624-29 (1992); Joseph H. King, Jr., Limiting the Vicarious Liability of Franchisors for
the Torts of Their Franchisees, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 417, 438-59 (2005).
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franchise store employees and encourage employment law violations
through recommendations that trigger employment law obligations.
Both are limited to representations by franchisors that franchisors can
modify or eliminate in order to avoid liability. They can, however, in-
clude reliance requirements that limit their relevance in some
jurisdictions.
1. Apparent Agency
The most plausible extension of liability to franchisors for harms
caused by franchisees outside of joint employment is the apparent, or
ostensible, agency doctrine, which holds the franchisor liable, even if
the franchisee is not an agent, if franchisor representations cause the
harmed party to reasonably believe that the franchisee is an agent of
the franchisor.188 A franchisor whose franchisee is an apparent agent
is strictly liable for the franchisee's legal violations, similar to a
franchisor found to be a joint employer. But unlike the joint employer
test, which directs its inquiry to the relationship between franchisor
and franchisee, apparent agency is established based on franchisor
representations to franchise store employees. As a result, the apparent
agency theory complements the joint employer test by expanding the
inquiry to the franchisor-franchise store employee relationship.
Although apparent agency has most commonly been used in vica-
rious liability claims against franchisors for harms to consumers in
franchise stores,189 courts have endorsed the apparent agency theory
that a franchisor's measures to ensure brand uniformity can create a
reasonable belief in franchise store employees that the franchisee is an
agent of the franchisor as well. In Myers v. Garfield Johnson Enter-
prises,190 for example, the court held that a franchise employee "may
188 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) ("One who repre-
sents that another is his servant or other agent and thereby causes a third person justifiably to
rely upon the care or skill of such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for
harm caused by the lack of care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if
he were such.").
189 See Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156, 166-67 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming jury
decision finding franchisor liable for harm to franchisee customer under apparent agency the-
ory); Bartholomew v. Burger King Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1051 (D. Haw. 2014) (reasoning
that the franchisor's required sign, "architectural and color scheme," and materials inside the
store with the franchisor's name and mark all could lead to a consumer's justifiable reliance
"upon an apparent agency relationship between [the franchisee] and Burger King"); Butler v.
McDonald's Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 (D.R.I. 2000) (finding sufficient questions of fact to
preclude summary judgment on apparent agency theory); Miller v. McDonald's Corp., 945 P.2d
1107, 1113-14 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); King, supra note 187, at 439.
190 679 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Pa. 2010).
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establish Title VII liability based on [the franchisor's] apparent con-
trol over [the franchisee]."191 In that case, internal branding measures,
including evidence that the franchisor's training materials referred to
employees at franchise stores as "employees" and that franchisor em-
ployees supervised franchise store employee work were sufficient to
allege the franchisor's apparent authority.92 The court in Miller v.
D.F. Zee's likewise found that the franchisor's required conspicuous
posting of its marks in the franchise store along with the lack of indi-
cation that the franchisee was the owner of the store and the fact that
the franchise store employees "believed they were [the franchisor's]
employees" were sufficient to allege apparent authority.193
Ochoa, which alleged the apparent agency of a McDonald's fran-
chisee under state wage-and-hour law, suggests the potential of appar-
ent agency claims based on the franchisor's control and loyalty
measures.194 In Ochoa, plaintiff franchise store employees asserted
that independent of the franchisee's joint employer status with Mc-
Donald's, the franchisor was jointly and severally liable for employ-
ment law violations because the franchisee was its apparent agent.19 5
In their apparent agent theory, plaintiffs alleged that franchise store
employees reasonably believed that McDonald's employed them
based on uncontroverted evidence that "they wear McDonald's
uniforms, serve McDonald's food in McDonald's packaging, receive
paystubs and orientation materials marked with McDonald's name
and logo, and . . . applied for a job through McDonald's website."1 96
While dismissing the plaintiffs' joint employer claim, the Ochoa court
found that these internal branding measures sufficed for a reasonable
jury to conclude that the franchisee was an apparent agent of
McDonald's.19 7
These cases illustrate how, independent of whether the
franchisor-franchisee relationship is sufficient to show a joint em-
ployer relationship, an apparent agency theory can account for the
franchisor's implicit promise in the franchisor-franchise store em-
ployee relationship of a workplace that complies with employment
laws.198 Grounded in the franchisor's own representations, apparent
191 Id. at 613.
192 Id. at 615.
193 31 F. Supp. 2d 792, 808 (D. Or. 1998).
194 Ochoa v. McDonald's Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1235-36 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
195 Id. at 1239.
196 Id. at 1240.
197 Id. at 1235-40.
198 See id.
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agency recognizes the franchisor's considerable indirect control over
franchise store employee work and use of internal branding measures
to enlist franchise store employee loyalty to champion the franchisor's
brand to the consumer, despite the lack of a contractual relationship.
2. Misrepresentation
Franchisor liability may also arise from the franchisor's omissions
about a franchisor's policy, recommendation, or business tools that
trigger employment law requirements. Unlike the apparent agency
theory, a misrepresentation claim recognizes the franchisor's liability
for representations to the franchisee that may harm the franchise
store employee as a third party and, ultimately, solvent franchisees
held liable for the employment law violations. It recognizes the fran-
chisee's dependency on the franchisor, who, as the more sophisticated
party, is better positioned to understand how to use a standard or bus-
iness tool in a manner that is legally compliant. It also recognizes the
implicit promise in the franchisor-franchisee relationship that fran-
chisees that adopt the franchisor's required and recommended poli-
cies and business tools can operate a stable and profitable business by
extending liability to franchisors for representations that instead en-
courage employment law violations that ultimately harm the fran-
chisee's business.
Although courts narrowly construe common law misrepresenta-
tion claims,199 courts have adopted a broader standard under state
fraud and franchise laws, which prohibit deceptive business conduct2 00
and impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing on franchisors.201
State consumer protection statutes, which can protect franchisees,2 02
often define misrepresentation broadly to prohibit business conduct
199 See, e.g., Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 118-19
(N.Y. 1985) (requiring a showing that the parties "sufficiently approach[] privity" and that the
defendant "must have" known that the other parties would rely on its representations).
200 See Cary Silverman & Jonathan L. Wilson, State Attorney General Enforcement of Un-
fair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Laws: Emerging Concerns and Solutions, 65 U. KAN. L. REV.
209, 215-16, 215 n.40 (2016).
201 Emerson, supra note 184, at 929. Franchise law creates a general duty for franchisors
not to misrepresent he franchise terms to franchisees, with specific disclosure requirements. 15
U.S.C. § 45(m) (2012); 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.1-.5 (2016). The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
and many states began to regulate franchisor disclosures in the 1970s as a response to the per-
ceived growth in unfair and deceptive practices in franchising. See, e.g., Clapp v. Peterson, 327
N.W.2d 585, 586 (Minn. 1982) (explaining that state franchise law "was adopted in 1973 as reme-
dial legislation designed to protect potential franchises within Minnesota from unfair contracts
and other prevalent and previously unregulated abuses in a growing national franchise
industry").
202 See, e.g., Canha v. LaRoche, No. CA 95510, 1996 WL 1186959, at *6 (Super. Ct. Mass.
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that has the tendency or capacity to deceive and do not require a
showing of the common law fraud elements of reliance and intent to
deceive.203
State franchise laws, similar to consumer fraud statutes, create a
general duty for franchisors not to defraud franchisees, with corollary,
specific disclosure requirements.204 Under New York franchise law, for
example, it is
unlawful for a person, in connection with the offer, sale or
purchase of any franchise, to directly or indirectly: . . . (b)
[m]ake any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading.205
This can include representations that trigger employment law obliga-
tions. In Gadson v. Supershuttle International,206 for example, the
court denied a motion to dismiss a Maryland franchise law claim by
franchisees, who drove vans for the franchisor, alleging that the
franchisor employed them but improperly failed to disclose costs and
fees that diminished their earnings to below the state minimum
wage.207 The court held that plaintiffs' allegation that the franchisor
omitted information about the illegal costs and fees drivers would in-
cur sufficed to allege a violation of state franchise law.20 8
Pending litigation by the New York Attorney General against the
franchisor Domino's Pizza illustrates how franchisor policies and busi-
ness tools that encourage employment law violations can support a
misrepresentation theory under state fraud and franchise laws.209 The
New York Attorney General brought Domino's Pizza against the
franchisor after an investigation of twelve franchisees in New York
State, in which all franchisees admitted violations of wage-and-hour
Aug. 12, 1996) (holding that franchisees may bring action against franchisors f r violation of
Massachusetts consumer protection laws).
203 Silverman & Wilson, supra note 200; see, e.g., People v. Coventry First LLC, 861
N.Y.S.2d 9, 10-11 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008), affd, 915 N.E.2d 616, 621 (N.Y. 2009); People v. Apple
Health & Sports Clubs, Ltd., 613 N.Y.S.2d 868, 869 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
204 The Federal Trade Commission's franchisor rule ("FTC Rule") places a duty on
franchisors to disclose details about the franchisor's business and the nature of the franchise
relationship and subjects franchisors who engage in unfair or deceptive practices to penalties and
injunctive relief. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
205 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 687(2)(b).
206 No. 10-cv-01057-AW, 2011 WL 1231311 (D. Md. Mar. 30, 2011).
207 Id. at *1-2.
208 Id. at *12.
209 Domino's Gerstein Aff. Supp. V. Pet., supra note 103, paras. 34, 36, 40-45.
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laws. The New York Attorney General alleges that Domino's required
franchisees to use a payroll system that it knew systematically under-
reported owed wages.210 It is allegedly impossible for franchisees to
discover this because the payroll system does not show its underlying
calculations.211 The franchisor was allegedly aware for years that the
payroll system systematically underreported wages but did not fix the
software or report the problem to franchisees.212 According to the suit,
at least some franchise store employees were underpaid in amounts
that track the underreported wages owed in the franchisor's payroll
program.2 13
As asserted in Domino's Pizza, franchisor-required or -recom-
mended personnel policies and business tools may violate state fraud
and franchise laws, insofar as a known defect in a mandatory business
tool may constitute a material fact that the franchisor must disclose
under state franchise law, and the failure to disclose or correct the
defect may constitute statutory misrepresentation.2 1 4 Unlike the tradi-
tional joint employer doctrine, which often disregards evidence of
franchisor recommendations and business tools that the franchisor
presents as optional, a misrepresentation theory takes into account
the dependence of franchisees on franchisors for operational guidance
and their loyalty in implementing these measures without question.
Accounting for these dependence and loyalty measures will be crucial
in addressing the unique incentives in franchising that can encourage
employment law violations in franchise stores.
These emergent215 theories have improved the narrow control-
based test often used in franchisor joint employer cases. Together, ap-
parent agency and misrepresentation theories complement the joint
employer test by accounting for the control, dependency, and loyalty
measures that franchisors use to protect their brand in franchise
stores, including in ways that can encourage employment law viola-
tions. These emergent theories, therefore, can be an important correc-
tive for the shortcomings of the joint employer doctrine.
210 Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of Verified Petition at 5, People v. Dom-
ino's Pizza, Inc., No.450627/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 4, 2016).
211 Id. at 37-38.
212 Id. at 5-8.
213 Id. at 36-41; see Elmore, supra note 147, at 79.
214 This is the New York Attorney General's theory in Domino's. See Amended Memoran-
dum of Law in Support of Verified Petition, supra note 210, at 36-41.
215 As of this writing, the Domino's Pizza case is still pending. McDonald's "provide[d] no
argument to the contrary" regarding employees' reasonable beliefs, effectively conceding that
element of the apparent agency claim. Ochoa v. McDonald's Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228,
1239-40 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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3. The Defeasibility of Apparent Agency and Misrepresentation
Claims Through Heightened Reliance Requirements
As theories centered on the franchisor's representations, the most
important limitation to apparent agency and misrepresentation theo-
ries in franchising cases is a reliance requirement216 that would permit
franchisors to defeat both claims through conspicuous notice in the
franchise agreement and to franchise store employees. Franchisors
can overcome claims of apparent agency with adequate disclosure of
the franchisee's independent ownership,2 1 7 while in a misrepresenta-
tion claim, which focuses on the franchisor-franchisee relationship,
franchisors may avoid liability through merger, integration, and non-
reliance clauses in the franchise agreement.2 18
Salazar v. McDonald's Corp.,2 19 a companion case to Ochoa with
the same facts, demonstrates the limitation that a reliance require-
ment can impose, particularly in class-wide allegations of employment
law violations. California adopts a restrictive form of the apparent
agency test, requiring a heightened reliance showing of actual, subjec-
tive belief and reasonable, nonnegligent belief.220 The Salazar court
demonstrated the difficulty of meeting these lements on a class-wide
basis, holding (1) that the reasonable belief element of an apparent
agency claim requires an "individualized inquiry," and (2) that evi-
dence that some franchise store employees did not receive the same
orientation materials or training, and did not understand the fran-
chisee to be an agent of McDonald's, preclude class certification.2 2 1
The long tenure of some franchise store employees, who were more
aware of the separate operation of the franchise store by the fran-
chisee than short-term employees, led the court to conclude that the
216 In a misrepresentation claim, the franchisee must show reasonable reliance on the
franchisor's representation. See Cook v. Little Caesar's Enters., 210 F.3d 653, 659 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that misrepresentation claim under Michigan franchise law requires a showing of rea-
sonable reliance).
217 See, e.g., Allen v. Greenville Hotel Partners, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 672, 680-82 (D.S.C.
2006) (finding use of franchisor's marks in hotel and advertisements insufficient to establish
apparent agency because of prominent notice in hotel registration desk and elsewhere that hotel
was owned and operated by the franchisee).
218 See, e.g., Papa John's Int'l, Inc. v. Dynamic Pizza, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d 740, 747-48
(W.D. Ky. 2004) (finding that merger clause made any franchisee reliance on oral representa-
tions by the franchisor unreasonable).
219 No. 14-cv-02096-RS, 2017 WL 88999 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017).
220 Id. at *2-7. Under California law, apparent "agency exists where (1) the person dealing
with the agent does so with reasonable belief in the agent's authority; (2) that belief is 'generated
by some act or neglect of the principal sought to be charged,' and (3) the relying party is not
negligent." Ochoa, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 1239.
221 Salazar, 2017 WL 88999, at *3.
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franchise store employees' experiences "are too varied" to support a
finding of subjective belief, foreclosing a class-wide apparent agency
theory for all franchise store employees.222
Salazar suggests that a test that hinges on reliance, by the fran-
chisee or franchise store employee, may create daunting challenges as
a vehicle for aggregate litigation of employment law violations be-
cause claims may be easily defeated through cosmetic changes that
would not improve employment law compliance in franchise stores.
Franchisors may, for example, seek to defeat liability under both re-
gimes by providing notice to franchise store employees that they are
not joint employers and to the franchisees about the possibility that a
recommendation or policy tool could trigger an employment law obli-
gation, or with merger and nonreliance provisions in the franchise
agreement. As with a narrow version of the joint employer test, it
would not incentivize franchisor precautions to deter employment law
violations, but rather provide franchisors with an incentive to restruc-
ture operations to avoid liability.
Recognizing the unfairness of permitting franchisors to avoid lia-
bility through cosmetic notices and franchise agreement waivers, some
courts have found franchisor disclaimers of an agency relationship in-
sufficient, instead requiring consideration of the entire record.223 As in
Ochoa, plaintiffs may satisfy a reliance requirement with a showing
that they believed that the franchise store would comply with employ-
ment law because of the franchisor's control over workplace opera-
tions.224 Other courts narrowly construe general merger clauses in the
franchise agreement, finding that they do not contradict extrinsic evi-
dence of the franchisor's representations to the franchisee.225 As a re-
sult, the extent to which reliance represents a significant limitation to
these theories will depend on the jurisdiction and may be addressed
through lawmaking, which will be explored in the next Section.
222 Id. at *7.
223 See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Burger King Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 1043, 1051 (D. Haw. 2014).
224 See Miller v. McDonald's Corp., 945 P.2d 1107, 1113 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that
detrimental reliance is not a required element of apparent agency doctrine, and that even if it
were, customer's reliance on quality of McDonald's food and service was based on the reasona-
ble belief that it would be the same as in the other McDonald's stores she patronized).
225 See, e.g., Travelodge Hotels Inc. v. Honeysuckle Enters., 357 F. Supp. 2d 788, 795-96
(D.N.J. 2005) (finding that merger and integration clauses were too general to disclaim misrepre-
sentations). In this analysis, a merger clause may still provide a defense to a misrepresentation
claim if the provision is sufficiently specific about the particular types of representations that the
franchisor has made to the franchisee that would defeat a misrepresentation claim. See, e.g.,
Prince Heaton Enters. v. Buffalo's Franchise Concepts, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1357,1361-62 (N.D.
Ga. 2000).
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B. Franchise Regulation for Optimal Deterrence
Although apparent agency and misrepresentation theories have
their origin in common law, it is no accident that the most prominent
examples of them allege violations of statutes that integrate these the-
ories in their liability regimes.226 Generally, lawmaking can add preci-
sion to any common law standard of care. Here, lawmaking can limit
or eliminate common law reliance elements that might foreclose liabil-
ity, and address the potential objection of overbreadth, which may
sweep in passive investors or small franchisors,227 by expressly ex-
empting these franchisors from liability.
Although federal law could certainly incorporate these standards,
state law 2 28 has long regulated the relationship between franchisors
and franchisees, and may also address other factors that may cause
over- or underdeterrence, such as franchisee insolvency, blanket in-
demnity clauses, choice of law provisions and general waivers, and the
possibility of crippling liability under vicarious liability or frivolous
claims.2 2 9 Unlike federal franchise law, which contains no private right
of action,23 0 states may confer a contract law remedy to franchise store
employees harmed by franchisor policies and business tools that en-
226 The misrepresentation claim in Domino's Pizza arises from the state fraud and
franchise law statutes, V. Pet. for N.Y., supra note 41, paras. 6-7, while Ochoa claims a violation
of California wage-and-hour law, which defines employment to include entities that "directly or
indirectly, or through an agent or any other person ... exercis[ing] control over wages, hours, or
working conditions of any person." Ochoa v. McDonald's Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1235-39
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
227 See David J. Franklyn, Toward a Coherent Theory of Strict Tort Liability for Trademark
Licensors, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 41-48 (1998).
228 Although the FTC also regulates franchisors, its regulation is restricted to disclosure
requirements. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.2 (2017). In contrast, twenty-two states regulate the sale of
franchises and eighteen regulate the postpurchase franchising relationship. Emerson, supra note
62, at 910, 912. In addition to the states' more robust regulation of franchising, the federal gov-
ernment is an unlikely source for near-term regulation of the joint employer relationship, as
DOL withdrew its guidance about joint employment. See News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor,
U.S. Secretary of Labor Withdraws Joint Employment, Independent Contractor Informal Gui-
dance (June 7, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/opalopa20170607 [https://perma.cc/
W5Y9-Y5N6].
229 States prohibit choice of law provisions and waivers in franchise agreements to contract
around state franchise law obligations, which will foreclose evasions of a liability through waiver.
See, e.g., M-m. STAT. ANN. § 80C.21 (West 2016) (prohibiting waiver of franchise law by "any
condition, stipulation or provision, including any choice of law provision, purporting to bind any
person"); Wright-Moore Corp. v. Ricoh Corp., 908 F.2d 128, 133 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
Indiana franchise law applied despite choice of law provision).
230 See, e.g., A Love of Food I, LLC v. Maoz Vegetarian USA, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 3d 376, 382
(D.D.C. 2014) (holding no private right of action to enforce FTC Rule).
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courage employment law violations, either directly or by making them
third-party beneficiaries to these specific obligations.2 3 1
These factors make a strong case for a liability regime established
through state lawmaking, holding franchisors jointly and severally lia-
ble for employment law violations in franchise stores where
(1) franchise store employees reasonably believe that the franchisor is
a joint employer or (2) franchisors make representations to franchis-
ees about recommended or required business practices that create a
likelihood of employment law violations unless franchisors take af-
firmative actions to ensure compliance.
Both standards could draw from existing common law standards
to amend existing state labor, fraud, and franchise laws. To extend its
apparent agent theory in employment law, California, for example,
could broaden its apparent agency test by relaxing the reliance re-
quirement, relieving the need for an individualized inquiry into
whether a franchise store employee's belief of an employment rela-
tionship with the franchisor is reasonable. States could define the
franchisor's obligation in state fraud and franchise laws by elaborating
the required franchisor actions to ensure employment law compliance
for recommended and required personnel policies and business tools
that trigger employment law obligations. Lawmaking may further pro-
vide that franchisor notices are not dispositive and that a determina-
tion of the franchise store employees' reasonable beliefs and the
reasonable likelihood of employment law violations cannot be waived
in the franchise agreement and must be drawn from the whole record.
In addition, lawmaking can also address the possibility of fran-
chisee insolvency by requiring franchisee insurance to avoid un-
derdeterrence. If a significant portion of franchisees are judgment
proof, expanding liability to franchisors is unlikely to deter franchisee
employment law violations because judgment-proof franchisees are
not exposed to the full costs of their activity. Moreover, franchisor
strict liability for a judgment-proof franchisee's harm may lead to
overdeterrence in the form of reducing the number of franchise-
owned stores or franchising only to multiunit franchisees.232 This sug-
gests the additional need for franchisees to obtain sufficient insurance
231 Franchise laws can direct franchisors to include specific terms in franchise agreements,
including terms that can be enforced by franchise store employees. See, e.g., Chen v. St. Beat
Sportswear, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 355, 361-66 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that garment workers as
third-party beneficiaries could claim breach of contract between garment manufacturer and
DOL to comply with wage-and-hour law).
232 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 260 (2004).
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coverage for foreseeable harms that might occur through employment
law violations. A more robust liability insurance market can introduce
insurers to engage in risk management with franchisors, which may
lead to further regulatory refinements as these stakeholders identify
optimal precautions.233
In sum, extending third-party liability to franchisors in instances
in which the employees reasonably believe that a franchisor is a joint
employer, and in which the franchisor provides policies, recommenda-
tions, and business tools to franchisees that may trigger employment
law violations, backed by an insurance requirement for potentially in-
solvent franchisees, is more likely to improve employment law compli-
ance than the status quo.
C. The Overdeterrence Critique and Negligence as an Alternative
Liability Standard
There are two primary critiques to an extension of franchisor lia-
bility grounded in franchisor representations to franchisees and
franchise store employees. The first is that, similar to the franchisor
critiques of Browning-Ferris, any extension of third-party liability in
franchising will cause overdeterrence, harming franchising as an eco-
nomic model. Alternatively, one might critique this liability regime for
insufficiently encouraging franchisors to monitor and cure franchise
store employment law violations unrelated to franchisor representa-
tions and propose a broad negligence standard to establish an optimal
level of care.
The remainder of this Part will discuss these critiques in turn.
1. The Overdeterrence Critique
The primary potential critique of an expanded joint employer lia-
bility regime is that increasing regulation may not improve the stan-
dard of care but will deter socially beneficial activity.234 Applied here,
extending franchisor liability for franchise store employment law vio-
lations may result in a glut of frivolous claims.235 This may cause
franchisors to own their own units instead of franchising them, reduc-
ing opportunities for first-time business owners. Franchisors could
also restructure operations to remove any operational control over
233 See Sharkey, supra note 178, at 384 & n.219 (describing how workers' compensation
movement turned to "no-fault" insurance to counteract the limitations and inefficiencies of tort
law).
234 See SHAVELL, supra note 232, at 260.
235 See Hanks, supra note 43, at 9.
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franchise stores, even if inefficient, or opt not to open new units at
all. 23 6
As a first response to this critique, extending franchisor liability
via apparent agency and misrepresentation theories accounts for the
franchisor critique of an unbounded joint employer test. These doc-
trines confine third-party liability to franchisor representations to
franchisees and franchise store employees. They do not extend liabil-
ity to franchisors using franchising models, such as distributorships,
that entail little guidance to franchisees or franchise store employees
about store operations. For other franchisors, to limit liability,
franchisors need only take sufficient action to eliminate a reasonable
belief that they are joint employers and to refrain from representa-
tions to franchisees likely to cause employment law violations. To the
extent that this may result in increased costs, these must be balanced
against ensuring legal compliance in a cost-effective manner.
To the extent that a private right of action would result in a glut
of frivolous claims,2 3 7 this possibility can be addressed by narrowing or
eliminating private enforcement. Liability expansion could be coupled
with several, or "guarantor," status for the franchisor, requiring plain-
tiffs to first seek recovery from franchisees, and only obligating
franchisors to satisfy judgments in cases of franchisee insolvency.238
Several liability would reduce the incentive for franchisors to select
judgment-proof franchisees, but would entail higher administrative
costs and erect barriers to justice that would not counteract the ra-
tional apathy of franchise store employees.239 Alternatively, lawmak-
236 See, e.g., Save Local Business Act. Hearing on H.R. 3441 Before the H. Subcomm. on
Workforce Protections and the H. Subcomm. on Health, Emp't, Labor and Pensions of the H.
Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 115th Cong. 3 (2017) (written statement of Tamra Kennedy,
President, Twin City T.J.'s, Inc.) (explaining that franchisor will no longer provide franchisee
with employee handbooks "even though my [franchisor] has the expertise and best practices that
would be most helpful for me and my employees").
237 There are many disincentives to complaining-the hassle and expense of litigation and
the possibility of retaliation chief among them-such that it seems equally possible that meritori-
ous claims will be suppressed. See ANNETFE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAws, UNPROTECTED
WORKERS 25 (2009) (national survey of low-wage workers found that nearly forty-three percent
of workers who complained about workplace conditions reported employer retaliation).
238 See Hanks, supra note 43, at 8-9 (arguing that a franchisor guarantor requirement is
likely to induce monitoring and policing to ensure optimal precautions by franchisees).
239 Joint and several liability has the advantage over a guarantor requirement of overcom-
ing the rational apathy and cost aversion of victims by providing incentives to the victim to sue
by removing barriers to justice. See Hans-Bernd Schaefer, The Bundling of Similar Interests in
Litigation. The Incentives for Class Actions and Legal Actions Taken by Associations, 9 EUR. J.L.
& ECON. 183, 185 (2000) (Neth.) (discussing rational apathy and cost aversion of tort victims in
the class action context).
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ing could vest enforcement exclusively in an administrative agency.
This would eliminate the possibility of frivolous private claims but
would erect greater barriers to access to justice that may result in un-
derdeterrence.240 Whether deterring frivolous claims or encouraging
meritorious ones is preferable depends on whether over- or un-
derdeterrence is more likely. This is an empirical question that can be
resolved in either event.
Yet beyond these limited exceptions, a modest extension of liabil-
ity to franchisors is unlikely to harm franchising as an economic
model. Generally, shifting the costs of some employment law viola-
tions to franchisors is unlikely to raise franchising costs sufficiently to
outweigh the economic incentives to franchise unless damages exceed
the harm.241 As Alan Sykes argues, joint and several liability is partic-
ularly efficient in the case of insolvent agents because it avoids impos-
ing arbitrary costs on innocent third parties harmed by the agent's
conduct.2 42 For solvent franchisees, the franchisor who must compen-
sate the franchise store employee can externalize this cost by exercis-
ing a redress against the franchisee.243 The benefits of franchising to
franchisors other than reducing employment law liability-low moni-
toring costs, no need for upfront capital, and eliminating the risk of
business failure-should outweigh the cost of some additional
franchisor liability.
Any adverse economic impact of franchise regulation, moreover,
is offset by its noneconomic benefits. It prevents the unjust result of
shifting the costs of employment law violations to franchise store em-
ployees whose franchisees are judgment proof and who are least able
to absorb or prevent the harm. Imposing liability on franchisors based
240 This is the enforcement regime for the FTC Rule, which does not confer a private right
of action and may only be enforced by the FTC. See A Love of Food I, LLC v. Maoz Vegetarian
USA, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 3d 376, 382 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding no private right of action to enforce
FTC Rule). Courts, however, often consider the FTC Rule disclosure standards in determining
the duty under a claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith. See, e.g., Brill v. Catfish
Shaks of Am., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 1035, 1041 (E.D. La. 1989).
241 If damages exceed harm, franchisors may take inefficient precautions. See A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869,
879-81 (1998).
242 See Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 609 (1988)
(criticizing scope of employment limitations upon respondeat superior liability as inefficient be-
cause they incentivize contracting out liability to judgment-proof agents); see also Daryl J. Levin-
son, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 362-63 (2003).
243 See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1523-24 (1984);
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98
YALE L.J. 831, 831-84 (1989).
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on their representations to franchisees and franchise employees is
fairer to the parties by recognizing the implicit promises in the
franchise relationship that encourage franchisees to adopt policies and
business tools that may cause employment law violations and
franchise store employees to work in franchise stores under the im-
pression that the franchisor ensures legal compliance. At the same
time, it creates a consistent, predictable liability standard that
franchisors can control by modifying their representations to franchis-
ees and franchise store employees. Whatever modest costs that might
arise are therefore justified to prevent injustice, to more effectively
regulate the franchise relationship, and to remove the economic in-
centive to use franchising as an end run around employment law
liability.
A third-party liability regime may also provide underdiscussed
benefits to the franchise relationship, as shown in the close parallel of
hospital liability for the medical malpractice of their physicians. Al-
though physicians are independent contractors, and not employees,
courts have found that the hospital-physician relationship is one of
apparent agency, and that hospitals separately owe a nondelegable
duty to the patient to comply with a reasonable standard of care.244
Similar warnings that expanding hospital liability for medical malprac-
tice will harm patient care24 5 did not come to pass. Hospitals them-
selves largely embraced the nondelegable duty and have integrated its
standards into their physician selection and accreditation proce-
dures,246 and the hospitals' liability for medical malpractice claims has
provided hospitals with "rich teaching tools" to improve hospital
safety standards.2 4 7 The imposition of liability based on franchisor rep-
resentations may induce franchisors, like hospitals, to more carefully
craft policies, recommendations, and business tools to deter violations,
and to admit franchisees and review franchise store practices in ways
that will improve employment law compliance.
244 Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 843, 851-53 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Irving v. Doctors Hosp. of
Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So. 2d 55, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); G. Keith Phoenix & Anne L.
Schlueter, Hospital Liability for the Acts of Independent Contractors: The Ostensible Agency
Doctrine, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 875, 879 (1986); Earlene P. Weiner, Note, Managed Health Care:
HMO Corporate Liability, Independent Contractors, and the Ostensible Agency Doctrine, 15 J.
CORP. L. 535, 544-50 (1990).
245 See Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform, 88 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1224, 1239-43 (2013).
246 See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolu-
tion of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 390 (1994).
247 Schwartz, supra note 245, at 1231.
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2. The Negligence Alternative
Alternatively, one might critique an extension of franchisor liabil-
ity that hinges on franchisor representations to franchisees and
franchise store employees as too narrow, leading to underdeterrence.
Franchisors that do not establish a direct relationship with franchise
store employees and that do not provide policies, recommendations,
or tools that trigger employment law obligations in franchise stores
risk no liability, even for harms, such as franchisee wage-and-hour law
violations, that are foreseeable and preventable. It would not correct
the current joint employer doctrine, which may deter franchisors from
monitoring activities that create foreseeable harms for fear of incur-
ring liability for themselves.2 48
A potential alternative approach, which applies a negligence stan-
dard for franchisors if their franchisees violate wage-and-hour law, has
recently been enacted in Australia.2 4 9 The new legislation imposes lia-
bility on all franchisors that have a "significant degree of influence"
over their franchisees and that "knew or could reasonably be expected
to have known" about employment law violations but failed to take
"reasonable steps" to prevent them.2 5 0 The Australian legislation, sim-
ilar to the third-party liability approach advanced by Brishen Rogers,
suggests a negligence standard as an important alternative liability
regime.2 51
Conceptually, a negligence standard in franchising may improve
employment law compliance in franchise stores, particularly in ad-
dressing the problem identified by David Weil, of franchisor standards
that impose exorbitant costs on franchisees, which franchisees shift to
franchise store employees in the form of wage-and-hour law viola-
tions. A negligence standard would impose a duty on franchisors to
monitor franchise stores for this foreseeable violation, reward
franchisors that monitor effectively by reducing their liability, and
lend credibility to franchisor measures that require franchisee compli-
ance.252 An additional potential benefit of a negligence standard in
248 See Rogers, supra note 16, at 47-53.
249 Anna Patty, Vulnerable Workers Bill Passed with Some Compromises, SYDNEY MORN-
ING HERALD (Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.smh.com.au/business/workplace-relations/vulnerable-
workers-bill-passed-with-some-compromise-20170904-gyaqy7.html [https://perma.cc/9D5S-
X7AH].
250 Fair Work Amendment (Protecting Vulnerable Workers) Act 2017 (Cth) sch 1 pts 2, 6.
251 Rogers, supra note 16, at 47-53.
252 That is, franchisors announcing a monitoring and policing policy to franchisees may be
less likely to deter franchisee misconduct in a strict liability regime because the franchisees will
know that the franchisor has little incentive to monitor and make good on its threats. See Jen-
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franchising is that these benefits would extend to franchisors regard-
less of their joint employer status. The joint employer doctrine will
always leave some franchisors beyond its outer boundary. A uniform
negligence standard would apply to all franchisors that can establish
an optimal level of care, regardless of operational control.
However, in practice, a general negligence standard cannot be ap-
plied on top of the existing joint employer doctrine without undermin-
ing either the effectiveness of the negligence or joint employer
standard. First, the effectiveness of a negligence standard in inducing
optimal care turns on the nature of the franchisor's duty. Sexual har-
assment law, for example, holds employers liable under a negligence
standard for harassment by coemployees. But it only imposes a gen-
eral duty on employers to take reasonable measures to prevent or stop
the harassment.253 A general reasonableness tandard, without articu-
lating an optimal standard of care that includes monitoring compli-
ance, is unlikely to induce franchisor monitoring of franchise stores to
ensure compliance with employment law. Franchisors fearing joint
employer status are unlikely to undertake specific measures, such as
monitoring, that a general duty would not require. This is a serious
shortcoming for violations that are difficult to detect without signifi-
cant monitoring, such as deterring franchise store managers from re-
quiring off-the-books work or adequate implementation of workplace
hazard or sex harassment policies. For these violations, franchisors
have superior access to measures to induce franchisee compliance, in-
cluding technology tools, on-site business consultants, and coercive
pressure to comply, up to and including franchise nonrenewal and ter-
mination. Antidiscrimination law scholars have also criticized .this
standard for deferring to the employer's measures in a reasonableness
nifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate
Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687, 699 (1997). Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman also
argue that a broad negligence standard avoids the perverse incentive of a control-based strict
liability standard not to undertake monitoring measures that may uncover violations that they
will ultimately be liable for because the costs of uncovering violations will be greater than the
strict liability that ultimately accrues from not monitoring. Id. at 753. It seems equally likely,
however, that franchisors may respond to strict liability by aggressively policing franchisee viola-
tions and resolving them informally and confidentially, thereby eliminating the reputational cost
of noncompliance to the franchisor and shifting the costs of violations to the franchisees. This
would, of course, also remove the deterrent effect that wider disclosure might yield.
253 Levinson, supra note 242, at 366. Steven Carvell and David Sherwyn propose this stan-
dard in franchising: to require franchisors to "exercise reasonable care to ensure that franchisees
are aware of employment laws with which they must comply." Carvell & Sherwyn, supra note 16,
at 35.
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inquiry254 and for ignoring the heavy incentives for supervisors to dis-
courage complaints.2 5 5
These limitations to a general duty of care suggest that a negli-
gence regime, particularly for difficulty-to-detect violations, is only
likely to be effective in inducing employment law monitoring in
franchise stores if backed by specific rules that require an optimal
level of care.25 6 This is, of course, contingent on the ability of courts,
franchise store employees, and government agencies to determine
what the optimal monitoring measures are.2 5
7
But even assuming the ability to identify the appropriate specific
negligence standard, this would require franchisors to exert day-to-
day supervision over the workplace in ways that may trigger vicarious
liability for all harms to franchise store employees and customers. A
specific negligence standard may thus require franchisors to choose
between violating the negligence standard and creating evidence of
joint employment and vicarious liability for all harms to third parties
caused by franchise stores, whether or not the franchise relationship
played a significant role in them.258 A franchisor facing this choice
254 This has been the trend in adjudication of the specific contours of the Faragher/Ellerth
standard in sexual harassment cases, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Lim-
its of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 24 (2006) (noting that courts rarely second-
guess internal compliance procedures); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Fail-
ure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 508-09 (2003), and in state statutes impos-
ing a negligence standard on contractors for wage-and-hour law compliance in subordinate
firms' workplaces. See Hyde, supra note 16, at 410-11.
255 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Formalism and Employer Liability, 2014 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 145,
155-56 (2014).
256 Australia's Fair Work Act seeks to do this by providing an affirmative defense to
franchisors that take "reasonable steps" to monitor, receive and address complaints. See Fair
Work Amendment (Protecting Vulnerable Workers) Act 2017 (Cth) sch 1 pt 2 558B(4); see also
Tess Hardy, Big Brands, Big Responsibilities? A Cross-Jurisdictional Review of the Regulation
of Work in Franchises 16 (June 2017) (conference paper) (on file with author).
257 Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 252, at 705, 709-14 (stating that a negligence standard
can equally induce preventive measures when "courts and enforcement officials can cheaply and
accurately identify the appropriate measures"). This standard could draw from the franchisor's
own existing plural model of franchising, in which franchisors have already adopted employment
law compliance policies for franchisor-owned stores and monitoring and policing measures in
franchisee-owned stores.
258 This is primarily a concern with franchisors otherwise outside of, but close to, the outer
boundary of joint employer and vicarious liability standards. Where courts have upheld em-
ployer legal compliance measures as evidence of an employment relationship, this is because the
lead firm's compliance measures significantly exceeded a general duty. Compare Taylor v. Wad-
dell & Reed Inc., No. 09CV2909 DMS (WVG), 2010 WL 3212136, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 12,
2010) (denying motion to dismiss claim that financial services company employed advisors, rea-
soning that plaintiffs' allegations of intensive day-to-day supervision, including right to discipline
and set specific work responsibilities and requirements, "may have gone beyond the general
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may rationally conclude that evading the specific negligence standard
is cheaper than incurring joint employer and vicarious liability.
Safe harbors are the most common way that lawmaking seeks to
avoid creating unforeseen liabilities for the regulated entities.259 There
is precedent for this approach in the safety requirements for motor
carriers in federal transportation regulations. Under federal law, mo-
tor carriers operating pursuant to United States Department of Trans-
portation ("USDOT") and state permits must "have exclusive
possession, control, and use" of their leased vehicles.2 60 USDOT
promulgated a regulation in 1992 to clarify that the regulation was not
"intended to affect whether the lessor or driver provided by the lessor
is an independent contractor or an employee of the authorized carrier
lessee."26 1 Courts since 1992 have deferred to USDOT, finding that
compliance with the regulation could not be used to show an employ-
ment relationship.262
But while a safe harbor may induce franchisors to police employ-
ment law compliance in franchise stores in some instances, it can also
undermine overall compliance by limiting evidence of control in joint
employer litigation. The joint employer doctrine remains a crucial
means to induce franchisors to deter employment law violations in
franchise stores. Even assuming a broad negligence standard, the strict
liability standard imposed by the joint employer doctrine is preferable
supervision required by [financial services regulation] and created an employer-employee rela-
tionship"), with Santangelo v. N.Y. Life Ins., No. 12-11295-NMG, 2014 WL 3896323, at *8-9 (D.
Mass. Aug. 7, 2014) (rejecting a firm's work rules and requirements established by the firm to
comply with federal and state financial regulation as evidence of employment of an insurance
salesperson, because there was otherwise "no genuine dispute that [the] plaintiff controlled the
'manner and means' of his work as an insurance agent").
259 A safe harbor provides a statutory exemption to a standard that the conduct would
otherwise violate. Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978, for example, contains a safe harbor in
which employers may avoid federal employment tax liability for having misclassified employees
as independent contractors under certain conditions. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2763, 2885-86; I.R.C. § 3401 annot. (2012) (reproducing section 530 in the
Internal Revenue Code).
260 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1) (2017).
261 Id. § 376.12(c)(4); see also, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 467-1.5 (LexisNexis 2017)
("Nothing in this chapter or in any of the rules adopted to implement this chapter shall be
deemed to create an employer-employee relationship between a real estate broker and the bro-
ker's licensees; provided that the commission shall have all power necessary to regulate the rela-
tionships, duties and liabilities among real estate brokers and real estate salespersons in order to
protect the public.").
262 See, e.g., Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 592 F.3d 853, 862-63 (8th Cir.
2010); Simpson v. Empire Truck Lines, Inc., 571 F.3d 475, 477-78 (5th Cir. 2009); Penn v. Va.
Int'l Terminals, Inc., 819 F. Supp. 514, 523 (E.D. Va. 1993); Kistner v. Cupples, 372 S.W.3d 339,
342-43 (Ark. 2010).
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for easily detectable employment law violations, such as employment
policies that facially violate antidiscrimination laws and payments be-
low the minimum wage. In these instances, the government and
franchise store employees may easily identify violations from hiring
and employment policies and payroll records. Franchisors strictly lia-
ble for violation of these standards have an incentive to use informal
means not accessible to the government to deter these violations.263 To
the extent that a specific negligence standard requires a safe harbor
that would exclude evidence of joint employer status from employ-
ment law litigation, imposition of a negligence standard in franchising
may erode the overall standard of care by removing the incentive ef-
fects of other liability regimes. For employment law, in which the joint
employer doctrine is the primary means to induce compliance mea-
sures by franchisors, this is a serious tradeoff, and one that should not
be undertaken without evidence that it is worth the cost.
In sum, although a negligence standard presents advantages over
a liability extension grounded in apparent agency and misrepresenta-
tion, an important benefit of these theories in franchising is that they
would complement, and not act as a substitute for, joint employer lia-
bility. A negligence standard is unlikely to improve compliance unless
it includes specific monitoring requirements, but these requirements
are unlikely to be followed unless they come with a safe harbor, which
may undermine the deterrent effect of the joint employer doctrine
and other liability regimes. This analysis suggests that a negligence
standard, although potentially inducing monitoring necessary to un-
cover and cure violations in franchise stores, requires difficult trade-
offs with uncertain outcomes. The new negligence standard in
Australia provides an important case study for empirical research
about whether these tradeoffs are justified.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown how the franchisor's measures to protect
its brand can create a reasonable belief in franchise store employees
that franchisors employ them and can induce franchisees to adopt bus-
iness policies and tools that trigger employment law obligations that
263 See Levinson, supra note 242, at 373. These are particularly compelling justifications in
franchising, where the franchisor has a variety of means to efficiently allocate risk and avoid
selecting judgment-proof franchisees at the contract formation stage. Professor LoPucki makes a
similar argument in favor of a trademark-based liability system: "The effect of the rule is to
remove most of the risk of defective products and licensee insolvency from the customer and
place it on the trademark owner, to the extent of the trademark owner's wealth." LoPucki, supra
note 175, at 1115.
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franchisees often violate. The current debate about whether to expand
or contract the joint employer doctrine to address the problem of em-
ployment law violations in franchise stores ignores the broader failure
of the joint employer doctrine to address these unique features of
franchising that can mask and encourage employment law violations.
This Article offers emergent apparent agency and misrepresentation
theories to improve employment law compliance in franchise stores,
which can be further refined through state regulation. These standards
have important implications for other contracting arrangements in
which firms contract out for labor costs but rely on employees to faith-
fully represent the brand to the consumer.
